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i 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
The importance of the Hotelling Valuation Principle (HVP) in economic study lies in its ability 
to examine and drive the decision of how much of a non-renewable natural resource to produce 
now versus how much to conserve for future generations - the root of natural resource policy, 
conservation, regulation, and taxation. Hotelling (1931) assumes that net price (selling price less 
cost per unit of production) will grow at the discount rate, which in a deterministic setting im-
plies that reserve value is equal to current net price. However, the application of this ideal theory 
to the oil and gas industry may be difficult. 
The oil and gas industry is influenced by government regulation, potential monopolistic 
forces, and well production characteristics - each of which violate the assumptions of Hotelling’s 
(1931) basic theory. How these violations affect the HVP is an open question. Most have the ef-
fect of limiting current supply, and thus driving prices higher than they would be in a perfectly 
competitive market. On the other hand, at least in the Canadian context, government regulation 
tends to increase costs, whereas technological advancement tends to reduce costs. The net result 
of these effects on future net prices and their discounted value, and therefore the effect on the 
HVP, is not clear a priori. 
Another problem relating Hotelling’s (1931) basic theory to the oil and gas industry lies 
in the stochastic nature of a firm’s future net prices and extraction quantities, the product of 
which gives the firm’s future cash flows. Correlation between quantity and net price may result 
from expanding production when prices are high and reducing production when prices are low. 
Of course such correlation will affect the expected cash flows, and therefore firm value. Or, in 
other words, the ability to adjust production quantity provides “real options” for oil and gas firms 
which may add value. 
Previous tests of the HVP on oil and gas reserves have utilized data that may contain con-
founding information that results in unreliable conclusions. The two major deficiencies include 
using (1) acquisition values, which utilize basin-average rather than firm specific net price data, 
and (2) conventional oil and gas company market valuations, which incorporate additional 
“management exploration expertise” value beyond the reserve’s value. 
This study contributes to the literature by providing a more definitive test of the HVP 
through the use of Canadian oil and gas royalty trusts. These “pure play” publicly traded entities 
are focused on production rather than exploration and essentially remediate the deficiencies 
found in previous literature. Additionally, I include an ancillary variable to proxy real option 
value and control variables for firm characteristics such as oil weighting (proportion of oil rela-
tive to natural gas reserves), reserve quality (proportion of proven producing reserves relative to 
proven non-producing reserves), and firm size (based on enterprise value). This gives the reader 
a better understanding of value drivers in the Canadian oil and gas royalty trust sector and how 
they relate to the HVP. 
My study generally fails to find support for the HVP. In particular, the results indicate 
that the HVP overestimates reserve value. This suggests that market participants expect net 
prices to grow at a rate significantly lower then the fair cost of capital, and production constraints 
limiting the extraction rate are binding. I do find that the real option proxy explains a significant 
amount of the difference between the value observed and the value predicted by the HVP. This 
differs markedly from what previous literature on the HVP applied to market data for the oil and 
gas industry documents. Each of these papers fails to reject the HVP. The fact that I generally 
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find the value to be lower than that predicted by the HVP is not surprising given the previous 
literature using market data to test it. Since these studies use conventional oil and gas companies, 
which likely overvalue reserves because of an exploration premium, finding support for the HVP 
likely means that royalty trusts will likely correspond to a value lower than that predicted. The 
difference could account for the exploration premium. On the other hand, when I use the log-
linear specification over the second, more volatile sub-sample, I also fail to reject Hotelling’s 
theoretical value, which is consistent with previous literature using market data. 
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CHAPTER 1   INTRODUCTION 
 
The importance of the Hotelling (1931) theory in economic study lies in its ability to examine 
and drive the decision of how much of an exhaustible natural resource to produce now versus 
how much to conserve for future generations. This discussion has been the root of theoretical and 
practical discussion regarding natural resource policy, conservation, regulation, and taxation.  
Hotelling (1931) proposed that based on the overall market, the value per unit of a re-
serve of an exhaustible natural resource is equal to the current net price (selling price per unit 
minus the cost of extracting the unit). This simple and straightforward proposal is based on the 
assumption that in a deterministic setting, net prices will rise at the prevailing discount rate in a 
market consisting of completely free competition. He based this assumption on the profit maxi-
mizing motives of the resource owners. In this scenario prices will adjust so that the projected 
return of the assets will be in line with other comparable capital assets. More specifically, a net 
price that is forecasted to rise at a rate higher than the discount rate will induce investment. This 
leads to higher supply and subsequent downward price pressure. The opposite is also true. If net 
price is forecasted to rise at a rate lower than the discount rate, capital investment will be steered 
away and supply will eventually fall. When supply falls, the price will experience upward pres-
sure back to the equilibrium level. This equilibrium balance of net prices rising at the discount 
rate provided Hotelling (1931) with the basis for his conclusion. 
However, the application of this ideal theory to the oil and gas industry may be difficult. 
The oil and gas industry is influenced by government regulation, potential monopolistic forces, 
and well production characteristics - each of which violate the assumptions of Hotelling’s (1931) 
basic theory. How these violations affect the theory is debatable. Government regulation and 
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monopolistic forces will likely have the effect of limiting supply, and thus driving selling prices 
higher than they otherwise would be in a perfectly competitive market. Conversely, at least in a 
Canadian context, government regulation tends to increase costs and technological advancements 
tend to reduce costs. The net result of these effects on future net prices and their discounted 
value, and therefore the effect on Hotelling’s (1931) assumptions, is not clear a priori. 
Another problem with relating Hotelling’s (1931) basic theory to the oil and gas industry 
lies in the stochastic nature of a firm’s future net prices and extraction quantities - the product of 
which produces the firm’s future cash flows. Correlation between quantity and net price may 
result from expanding production when prices are high and reducing production when prices are 
low. Of course, such correlation will affect the expected cash flows, and therefore the firm value. 
Or, in other words, the ability to adjust production quantity provides “real options” for oil and 
gas firms, which may add value. This stochastic characteristic is not captured under Hotelling’s 
(1931) deterministic theory. 
Due to the aforementioned characteristics of the oil and gas industry, previous studies 
finding support for Hotelling (1931) must be scrutinized carefully to conclude that either the vio-
lations are not serious, or there are factors that create coincidental support for the theory. Due to 
the outcomes of the previous studies it makes sense to retest Hotelling’s (1931) theory using a 
more appropriate data sample.  
The application of Hotelling’s (1931) theory to oil and gas reserves has been empirically 
tested several times over the years using the Hotelling Valuation Principle (HVP) created by 
Miller and Upton (1985a). These studies used a variety of methods to test the principle. Some of 
the studies found support for Hotelling (1931) while others have not. 
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1.1 MOTIVATION 
Previous studies of Hotelling (1931) on the oil and gas industry have relied on either acquisition 
transactions or market values. Upon reviewing these studies I suspected deficiencies for testing 
the HVP in both of these data samples. Using acquisition values does not allow for a precise test 
because accurate data for the net price of the specific properties purchased is not published. 
These authors applied averages for the entire basin which do not compensate for high or low net 
price properties. The unanimous conclusion from studies using acquisition values is that the HVP 
does not hold and using net price overvalues the reserves. 
Although many of the previous studies used market values, their focus was on conven-
tional oil and gas companies. These companies are also involved in the exploration for oil and 
gas and hence have a built in “management exploration expertise” premium over and above the 
value based on the reserves they currently possess. The unanimous conclusion from these studies 
is that the HVP does hold. However, their conclusion may be due to the extra value added by the 
“management exploration expertise” premium that is inherent in the value for these entities, not 
because the HVP holds. 
This study contributes to the literature by providing a more definitive test of the HVP 
through the use of Canadian oil and gas royalty trusts. These “pure play” publicly traded entities 
are focused on production rather than exploration and essentially remediate the noted deficien-
cies found in previous literature. Additionally, I include ancillary variables to proxy real option 
value, and control variables for firm characteristics such as oil weighting (proportion of oil rela-
tive to natural gas reserves), reserve quality (proportion of proven producing reserves relative to 
proven non-producing reserves), and firm size (based on enterprise value). This gives the reader 
a better understanding of value drivers in the Canadian oil and gas royalty trust sector and how 
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they relate to the HVP. 
Although three previous studies (Miller and Upton, 1985b, and Crain and Jamal, 1991 
and 1996) have used U.S. oil and gas royalty trusts (or similarly, master limited partnerships) in 
their samples, this study provides a unique and more precise test of the HVP for the following 
reasons: 
1. Canadian oil and gas royalty trusts are used in this study instead of U.S. royalty trusts. 
The Canadian oil and gas royalty trust market has proliferated and some of these trusts 
are even included in the Toronto Stock Exchange’s top index, the S&P/TSX Composite 
Index. This increase in popularity may indicate increased pricing efficiency and fewer 
pricing anomalies which allows for a more accurate estimation of reserve value.  
2. The sample period used in this study is longer and is characterized as having more vola-
tile energy prices and since costs for each firm remain relatively flat, this implies more 
volatile net prices, potentially resulting in a more powerful test. (Note that accepting the 
HVP is equivalent to failing to reject two linear restrictions, so clearly the power of the 
test is critical to the decision.)  
3. To see if factors other than net price have an affect on value, the study examines the sig-
nificance of other potential value drivers or control variables including real option value, 
oil versus gas weighting, reserve quality, and size. These factors are left out of the HVP, 
so finding significant effects provides evidence against it. 
 
1.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
My study generally fails to find support for the HVP. In particular, the results indicate that the 
HVP overestimates reserve value. This suggests that market participants expect net prices to 
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grow at a rate significantly lower then the fair cost of capital, and production constraints limiting 
the extraction rate are binding. I do find that the real option proxy explains a significant amount 
of the difference between the value observed and the value predicted by the HVP. This differs 
markedly from what previous literature on the HVP applied to market data for the oil and gas 
industry documents. Each of these papers fails to reject the HVP. The fact that I generally find 
the value to be lower than that predicted by the HVP is not surprising given the previous litera-
ture using market data to test it. Since these studies use conventional oil and gas companies, 
which likely overvalue reserves because of an exploration premium, finding support for the HVP 
likely means that royalty trusts will likely correspond to a value lower than that predicted. The 
difference would account for the exploration premium. On the other hand, when I use the log-
linear specification over the second, more volatile sub-sample, I also fail to reject Hotelling’s 
theoretical value, which is consistent with previous literature. 
The study is outlined as follows. Chapter 2 provides a review of previous literature con-
cerning the HVP as it relates to oil and gas reserve valuation, examines the deficiencies in the 
previous literature, and reviews how this study mitigates the mentioned deficiencies. Chapter 3 
describes the data used in this study and the process of collection. Chapter 4 reviews previous 
tests of the HVP, explains the current test, as well as additional tests used in this study. Chapter 5 
provides the results of the main study and the ancillary studies and attempts to explain the re-
sults. Chapter 6 provides a conclusion to the study. 
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CHAPTER 2   LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Previous papers on the HVP can be primarily categorized into a two-by-two matrix: those studies 
that either reinforce the principle or disagree with it and those studies that tested the theory using 
market valuation data or acquisition data. It turns out that these categories are not as distinct as 
they appear to be, since all of the studies that found support for the HVP use market data and all 
of the studies that reject it use acquisition data. I analyse the previous literature primarily along 
the criteria as to whether or not they find support for the HVP. 
 
2.1 PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
2.1.1 THE INITIAL THEORY 
Hotelling (1931) modeled the valuation of exhaustible resources by examining value in both the 
economic sense and social sense. He investigated how the owners, current consumers, and future 
consumers of the disappearing natural resource affect its price. He claimed that the rate of extrac-
tion in a competitive industry should be such that the net price (selling price less cost to extract) 
of the resource grows at a rate equal to the fair discount rate, which is the risk-free interest rate in 
his deterministic setting. Indeed, if net price grows faster than the fair discount rate, then re-
source owners will have the incentive to delay extraction, which will create an excess supply in 
the future, pushing future net prices down in equilibrium. Contrarily, if net price grows more 
slowly than the fair discount rate resource owners will have the incentive to expand current ex-
traction. Since the stock of reserves is fixed, this is equivalent to reducing future extraction, 
which will create an excess demand in the future, pushing future net prices up in equilibrium. 
The invisible hand of the competitive resource market acts to guide net price growth toward the 
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fair discount rate. 
In other words, a resource owner should be indifferent between accepting a current price 
per unit now and accepting a price per unit in the future that incorporates an acceptable time-
compensation component. If the price per unit of a resource is expected to rise at a rate higher 
than the discount rate, why extract the resource now?  If it is expected to rise at a rate lower than 
the discount rate, why wait to extract?  This implies that marginal present value of profits is con-
stant over all periods in a market consisting of completely free competition. Consequently, ac-
cording to Hotelling (1931), net prices must rise at a rate equal to the discount rate. Therefore, 
for all t, 
( ) ( )( )tttt rcpcp +−=− 100 ,               (2.1) 
where t is the time of extraction, p is the selling price per unit, c is the extraction cost per unit, 
and r is the fair discount rate. 
 One shortcoming of the above argument is how it applies to multiple firms or multiple 
reserves. In particular, some reserves may have better quality resources than others, and some 
may require lower extraction costs. Therefore, it is unreasonable for prices and costs to be equal 
for every reserve, and equally unreasonable for price and cost growth to be equal for every re-
serve. This makes it impossible for net price growth to be equal for every reserve, let alone equal 
to some common discount rate. This suggests that the equilibrium argument implies that an in-
dustry wide average net price should grow at the fair discount rate, but individual firms or re-
serves should extract resources according to the growth rates of their own individual net prices. 
Those with low growth will want to extract as quickly as possible and those with high growth 
will want to wait. Although not necessarily, these will often be reserves with low and high ex-
traction costs respectively. 
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 Another shortcoming has to do with the stochastic nature of future prices and costs. Since 
future demand and supply of the resource is stochastic, future prices will exhibit randomness. 
Therefore, growth in the above arguments should be replaced by expected growth and the fair 
discount rate may involve a risk premium. Moreover, different reserves may have different risk 
characteristics, so the fair discount rate may be reserve specific. 
To further complicate the issue, the expected growth rate in net price - hence the extrac-
tion rate - may be affected by the net price level outcome. This implies that net price and quan-
tity may be correlated, so the expected cash flow for a given time, which is the expected value of 
the product of net price and quantity, will generally not be the product of the expected net price 
and the expected extraction quantity. In particular, if the reserve’s net price growth rate decreases 
with net price level, then ideal extraction quantity will be positively correlated with net price 
level, and the expected cash flows will be greater than the product of the expected price levels 
and expected extraction quantity. 
The main conclusion to be drawn from this argument is that for a competitive reserve, the 
decision about whether to extract resources now or later depends on the (reserve specific) rate of 
growth of the (reserve specific) net price, and on the stochastic nature of that rate of growth. For 
a particular reserve, the current net price growth rate may be low enough to warrant immediate 
extraction, but doing so eliminates the possibility of extracting resources in the future should the 
value turn out to be even higher. Thus extracting the resources is equivalent to exercising a “real 
option” and the optimal exercise region depends on the entire distribution of the underlying as-
set, and not just the expected value. These arguments suggest that the value of a reserve should 
be no less than the current extraction value (the current net price times the quantity of reserves), 
and may be greater, especially for those reserves having a relatively low current extraction value. 
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Hotelling (1931) also discusses the case in which the reserve owner has market power, 
which is quite relevant to the oil industry. In this case he shows that the net price is higher and 
extraction occurs more slowly than the perfectly competitive case. Furthermore, the optimal 
growth rate of net price, which depends on the demand function, is higher than the fair discount 
rate (when demand is decreasing in price). This also implies that the value of a reserve should be 
higher than the current extraction value. 
Another issue with the theory involves the extraction rate - Hotelling (1931) based his 
equilibrium assumption on producers increasing production if the discount rate is higher than the 
net price growth rate and decreasing it in the opposite scenario.   In the oil and gas industry it is 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to produce all the reserves in a pool immediately without 
negatively affecting the total recoverable reserves in a pool.  This physical production constraint 
specific to the oil and gas industry means the equilibrium is harder to achieve and, as a result, 
implies that the value of reserves should be lower than the current extraction value. 
2.1.2 STUDIES FINDING EVIDENCE FOR HOTELLING (1931) 
Miller and Upton (1985a) brought forward a method to empirically test Hotelling’s (1931) theory 
applied to the oil and gas industry. They reiterated that the value of an exhaustible resource 
price-taking company with profit maximization intentions can be stated as a function of the pre-
sent value of cash flows generated by the reserve base. If net price grows at the rate of discount, 
then the value of a reserve is equal to the current net price per unit times the number of units cur-
rently in the reserve. In their test, observed market values per reserve unit for each company at a 
given point in time were regressed on the current net price. If the assumptions of Hotelling 
(1931) hold, the regression equation should have an intercept of zero and a slope coefficient of 
one under constant returns to scale. Based on their sample of 94 observations, 39 U.S. based 
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companies over a period that ranged from December 1979 to August 1981, they failed to reject 
these restrictions and concluded that the HVP does hold true. 
In a follow up study, Miller and Upton (1985b) completed a similar test based on 98 ob-
servations of U.S. based companies ranging from August 1981 to December 1983. They con-
cluded that a relationship still exists and the HVP still holds, however the R2 dropped signifi-
cantly from the first study. They attributed this to the difference in oil and gas prices over the 
two periods. The first period, which contained the Iranian Revolution and the commencement of 
the Iran-Iraq war, encompassed relatively volatile energy price movements while the second pe-
riod experienced low volatility in energy prices. 
In addition to their main study, Miller and Upton (1985b) also did an additional test on 
oil and gas royalty trusts. They purported that royalty trusts are a good vehicle for testing due to 
the fact that they are usually pure play oil and gas producers with a less risky, more mature base 
of reserves. The supplemental oil and gas royalty trust study again fell in line with their expecta-
tions that the HVP does hold, however the authors warned that the results must be taken with 
caution as only 12 observations were used. 
Crain and Jamal (1991) continued upon Miller and Upton’s (1985b) work by examining 
the HVP using oil and gas royalty trusts and master limited partnerships. They too argued that 
royalty trusts and master limited partnerships would provide a better vehicle for testing the HVP 
because they are solely involved in oil and gas production and do not participate in other related 
businesses such as pipelines or refining and the trusts were without any significant liabilities.  
They altered Miller and Upton’s (1985a) regression test specification by incorporating a double 
log transformation. Using 91 pooled observations of U.S. based entities spanning a period from 
1981 through to 1986 they confirmed a relationship between market value and current net price. 
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The authors concluded that their study reinforced support for the HVP and suggests that the log 
model may do a better job of explaining variation in value. 
 Thompson (1996) denounced the Crain and Jamal (1991) study on three bases: (1) Profit 
maximization may not be met as all of the reserves may not be produced due to the way the au-
thors specified the test, (2) The zero point estimates used for the intercept will result in the slope 
coefficient being removed from unity, and (3) The log-linear test specification is not in agree-
ment with the HVP put forth by Miller and Upton (1985a) because it does not follow the as-
sumption of constant returns to scale. He reinterpreted the data using the Miller and Upton 
(1985a) specification and did not find support for the HVP. He concluded his argument by stat-
ing that Crain and Jamal (1991) do not provide satisfactory evidence for the validity of the HVP. 
 Crain and Jamal (1996) provided a reply to Thompson’s (1996) criticisms. They retested 
their original data using the same linear specification put forth by Miller and Upton (1985a), and 
found an intercept that is not significantly different from zero and a slope coefficient that is close 
to one, validating the HVP for oil and gas pure plays. 
2.1.3 STUDIES FINDING EVIDENCE AGAINST HOTELLING (1931) 
Watkins (1992) argued that there is fundamental theoretical insight from the HVP but that it does 
not hold up particularly well in explaining the realities of energy reserve valuations. In the re-
view of previous work, Watkins (1992) stated that several problems occurred in Miller and Up-
ton (1985a, 1985b). First, the market value can only be an approximation since estimated liabili-
ties and non-reserve assets must be netted out. Second, the degree of fit, R2, is not particularly 
good. Third, the prices of transactions could be a better indicator of pure reserve value than mar-
ket-based values. His study used actual transaction values on 27 Canadian oil and gas reserve 
transactions spanning a period from February 1989 to March 1991. The data for net oil and gas 
11 
prices was based on average selling prices and an average of costs for gathering, operating, roy-
alties, and income taxes. He performed a ratio test on the data used in the study. The aggregate 
transaction value was placed in the numerator and the denominator consisted of the quantity of 
reserves times the net price of each reserve unit. If the HVP held, the ratio should approximate 
one. He observed that 25 of the transactions departed from the theoretical unity ratio while only 
two transactions approximated unity, and the average ratio was significantly different from one. 
Additionally, in order to make the transaction test comparable, he transformed the data so that it 
could be tested using the Miller and Upton (1985a) HVP regression equation with natural gas 
converted to an oil equivalent at 12 million Btu per barrel of oil equivalent, based on the eco-
nomic pricing of the commodities at the time of the study. The results rejected the HVP. 
 McDonald (1994) reiterated the findings of Watkins (1992) and emphasized that the HVP 
over predicts reserve value by a factor of approximately two. He reasoned that the overvaluation 
can be attributed to two main assumptions that may not be unrealistic in industry practice. First, 
producers may not have the flexibility to control extraction so that net prices rise at the discount 
rate and secondly, the regulation of well spacing and extraction in common pools also hinders 
the producers’ ability to control extraction over time. He argued that the compromised spacing 
enforced by the regulators results in operators not functioning at the profit maximizing extraction 
rate and consequently the conditions of the HVP will not be met. 
 Adelman and Watkins (1995) reemphasized the notion that the HVP overestimates the 
value of in-ground reserves. The data utilized in their study consisted of 34 purchase and sale 
transactions of Alberta based oil and gas reserves. 27 of the transactions were used in the previ-
ous study by Watkins (1992) and an additional seven observations were added. Again, only aver-
age (not property specific) selling price and cost data was used as many of the transactions did 
12 
not publish this information. They found that the HVP overstated the actual reserve value of a 
barrel of oil by approximately 2.5 times. Secondly, the value of gas was overstated by approxi-
mately 1.6 times. On average, the HVP overstated the value by two times on a total oil equiva-
lent basis. Since oil and gas reserves are subject to declines in pressure as the reserve is emptied 
(known as the decline rate) the entire pool cannot be instantaneously extracted. Instead the pro-
duction level declines over time as well pressure declines. They claimed that the slope coeffi-
cient should approximate [a/(a + i)], where a is the production/reserves ratio that represents the 
decline rate and i is the discount rate. They argued that this adjustment accounts for the physical 
production constraint of declining pressure inherent in oil and gas production. Since some pro-
duction will take place in one year, two years, etc. the net revenue that is expected to be gener-
ated in the future must be discounted at the discount rate in order to get today’s true value. 
 Cairns and Davis (1998) reached the same conclusion that the HVP overstated the value 
of reserves by approximately double. The reasons for this include physical production constraints 
due to declining well pressure, less than optimal well spacing regulations, and the possibility of 
incremental unit costs that increase with extraction. They obtained an intercept that was not sig-
nificantly different from zero, however the slope coefficient was significantly different from one. 
In order to avoid any gas conversion issues, the authors also performed the test using two ex-
planatory variables, oil and gas. The estimate for oil remained below one but the coefficient for 
gas was not significantly different from one.  
In another study, Cairns and Davis (1999) focused on creating a value range that essen-
tially encompasses the actual values of energy reserves. The HVP essentially creates an upper 
bound for oil and gas reserve value due to two main factors. Well pressure limits make it impos-
sible for an operator to realize full profit maximizing value and net prices are not expected to 
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increase at the discount rate. The lower bound is calculated using Adelman’s Rule which is based 
on a modified HVP. Instead of assuming a coefficient of one, the slope was calculated using a 
formula that incorporated the decline rate, discount rate, and expected change in net price. The 
authors used pessimistic assumptions for these added variables. This low case scenario resulted 
in a lower band of valuation. The authors also brought up the potential value add of real options 
in the oil and gas production industry. However, they concluded that option value does not have 
a major consequence on the value of producing reserves. To test the validity of their bands, 
Cairns and Davis (1999) applied their upper and lower limits to data used in three previous stud-
ies. 89% of the observations in Watkins (1992) fell within the boundary while 85% and 77% of 
the observations fell within the boundary for Miller and Upton (1985b) and Miller and Upton 
(1985a), respectively. 
The authors came out with another article, Cairns and Davis (2001), which focused on 
both the HVP and Adelman’s Rule. It reiterated that the HVP overvalues or provides an upper 
limit for the value of in-ground energy reserves due to production of oil and gas being physically 
constrained (cannot be produced instantaneously) and the net price does not grow at the discount 
rate. The authors argued that reserve values fall more in-line with Adelman’s Rule where an ad-
justment for decline rates is included. By incorporating well pressure effects, output regulation 
and other production profiles, Cairns and Davis (2001) confirm that Adelman’s Rule is more 
appropriate than the HVP for in-ground energy reserve valuations.  
Lin and Wagner (2007) re-examined the Hotelling (1931) theory by focusing on the im-
pact of stock volumes and technology. They argued that the costs to extract a resource do not 
remain constant over time. Rather, since the process of resource depletion usually commences 
with removing the most accessible reserves first, extraction costs increase as fields are depleted. 
14 
Offsetting the stock effects is the improvement of technological processes. As technology im-
proves the methods and techniques of extraction, costs decrease. They examined 14 subsoil as-
sets from 1970 to 2004 to test the Hotelling (1931) assumption of net price rising at the discount 
rate. They concluded that, over the 35 year period, only one mineral, gold, exhibited a negative 
growth rate with the remaining 13 exhibiting zero growth rates. They argued that the technology 
effect was able to offset the depleting assets stock effect and concluded that the assumption of an 
increasing net price within the Hotelling (1931) model is incorrect over the time period studied. 
2.1.4 OTHER RELEVANT ARTICLES 
McCardle and Smith (1999) focused on the techniques utilized by oil and gas entities to valuate 
oil and gas projects. These techniques can be applied on a larger scale, beyond single projects, to 
provide value estimates for entire entities. The study looked at two main valuation models: deci-
sion analysis and option pricing. The authors argued that option pricing is often ignored in evalu-
ating decision problems even though they may more appropriately incorporate downstream deci-
sions and can better account for market risk. However, decision analysis modeling can better 
value private risks such as project-specific production rates. As such, the authors recommend an 
integrated approach of decision analytic techniques and option valuation.  
McCormack and Sick (2001) argued that the value of oil and gas companies is greater 
than the theoretical value obtained through a standard discounted cash flow valuation. This 
valuation delta can be corrected through the use of real options by adding in a component to ac-
count for potential “upside” due to the firm’s ability to adjust the extraction rate of proven re-
serves or, to develop unproved reserves in the future. As with all value maximization transac-
tions, the owner will only decide to develop the resource if there is positive net present value. 
Their modeling process for real option value in oil and gas companies is similar to a financial 
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option and uses the Black-Scholes option pricing model as a template, with inputs that apply di-
rectly to the resource base and not an underlying financial asset. Interestingly, they find that al-
though the option value is real, many management teams fail to use this valuation methodology 
when implementing their corporate strategy. Additionally, the majority of incentive plans penal-
ize managers for delaying a project even though the economics may be improved in the future. 
Boyer and Filion (2007) studied the Canadian oil and gas industry focusing on what 
drives the industry’s market returns. Their study used data for 105 Canadian oil and gas compa-
nies but did not include Canadian oil and gas royalty trusts. They utilized five macroeconomic 
factors (interest rates, exchange rates, market returns, oil prices, and natural gas prices) and five 
company specific factors (proven reserves, production volume, debt level, operations cash flows, 
and drilling success) to explain what impacts the value of these entities. My study of the HVP 
using Canadian oil and gas royalty trusts also inherently incorporates many of the same drivers 
including macroeconomic factors such as interest rates, exchange rates, oil prices, and natural 
gas prices and company specific factors such as reserves, debt level, and operating cash flow. 
The articles covered in this literature review have created a wide spectrum of thought on 
the HVP - some authors find agreement with the simple model’s explanatory power while many 
others find a lack of evidence for it. While this literature review covers a variety of methods to 
test the HVP, their conclusions can hardly be considered decisive due to certain deficiencies. 
 
2.2 DEFICIENCIES IN PREVIOUS LITERATURE  
With the exception of Miller and Upton (1985b) and Crain and Jamal (1991, 1996), each of the 
previous studies on the HVP have included utilizing acquisition values and basin average costs, 
or utilizing conventional oil and gas company market valuations, both of which are deficient 
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samples to test the HVP.  
Some of the previous studies utilized acquisition values as the proxy for valuation of oil 
and gas reserves. Acquisition values are given in a press release announcing the transaction and 
other data given in the press release usually includes current production and an estimate for re-
serves and land. However, one of the key inputs that goes into the HVP, net price, is not given in 
the press release. Instead, the authors apply a “basin average” as the input which may lead to a 
major misspecification. For instance, the time period studied may have been during a period 
where high cost assets where popular to buy. In this case, the authors using averages would have 
overstated the net price and the study would have skewed the results and conclusions. Not being 
able to utilize net price data that is specific to the particular assets acquired is a major deficiency 
of the studies that used acquisition values. 
The other previous studies used the market values of conventional oil and gas companies. 
Although this type of data sample removes the issue of not obtaining specific net prices, it does 
create another issue. In order to see why conventional oil and gas companies are not a good sam-
ple for the HVP we must look at the activities they are involved in. Typically, they are involved 
in exploration and production. Simply by examining their activities we can see a problem - the 
HVP values reserves (and, if you have reserves you typically have production) but it does not 
account for exploration. Thus, by using conventional companies, the previous authors are not 
providing a pure test for the HVP (in particular, they overstate value). Figure 2.1 compares the 
composition of the enterprise value for conventional oil and gas companies against both acquisi-
tion values (as above) and oil and gas royalty trusts. 
It is apparent that a “management exploration expertise” premium can count for a large 
part of the value of a conventional oil and gas company. To illustrate this further, I consider a 
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“pure” exploration company that has no reserves. The value of such a company is based entirely 
on exploration potential, which presumably depends on management exploration expertise that 
has no relation to the amount of current reserves the company currently possesses. It is quite ap-
parent that using conventional oil and gas companies do not provide a pure test of the HVP. 
As is shown in the literature review, the articles that used acquisition values did not find 
support for the HVP (value was about half the net price) whereas those that used conventional oil 
and gas company market valuations did find support. In these studies it may be possible that the 
additional value was attributable to the “management exploration expertise” premium and had 
little to do with the current reserves. Therefore, this method is not a pure test of the principle and 
the affirmative results they have reached should be questioned. 
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Figure 2.1 Enterprise Value Breakdown Comparison 
This figure illustrates the differences in value composition among conventional oil and gas companies, acquisition 
values, and oil and gas royalty trusts. Value for these entities primarily consists of two sources: management explo-
ration expertise value and reserve value. Conventional companies typically have a large portion of their value com-
ing from its management exploration expertise. Acquisition values have zero value to management exploration ex-
pertise as only the assets are sold and purchased, not the management teams. Oil and gas royalty trusts only have a 
small portion of their value come from management exploration expertise since these entities are focused on produc-
ing already-found reserves, not discovering new pools of oil and gas. 
* Note:  Reserve value also reflects production value. 
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Both Miller and Upton (1985b) and Crain and Jamal (1991, 1996) did look at the U.S. 
royalty trust equivalent, master limited partnerships, but these did not incorporate other potential 
value drivers and these entities have all but dried up in the U.S. 
 
2.3 REMEDIATING THE DEFICIENCIES 
The deficiencies in the previous studies have created an opportunity for further study. My main 
contributions are an attempt to reduce the contamination in the previous studies by: 
1. using pure play entities (oil and gas royalty trusts) that have a limited “management 
exploration expertise” premium factored into their value; 
2. using specific extraction cost information that is specific to each trust in each time pe-
riod; 
3. using market trading values based on the efficient and liquid trading characteristics of 
Canadian oil and gas royalty trusts; 
4. using reserve estimates that are based on the most strict set of rules to date; 
5. using a time frame that contains the most commodity volatility; and 
6. testing for other potential value impacting drivers such as real options, oil weighting, 
quality of reserves, and size. 
By reducing the deficiencies in the previous studies this study should offer a more defini-
tive conclusion on the HVP and its application to valuing oil and gas reserves. 
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CHAPTER 3   DATA 
 
My study of the HVP focuses on Canadian oil and gas royalty trusts over the period 2000 to 
2006. 22 Canadian oil and gas royalty trusts are included which results in 107 observations. The 
breakdown of trusts and their respective years of data are as follows: 
 
Table 3.1 Observations by Trusts and Years of Data 
Years of 
Data  
Number of 
Trusts  
Total Obser-
vations 
7 x 6 = 42 
6 x 2 = 12 
5 x 4 = 20 
4 x 7 = 28 
3 x 0 = 0 
2 x 2 = 4 
1 x 1 = 1 
TOTAL  22  107 
 
Table 3.1 displays the distribution of observations sorted in ascending order by years of data. The vast majority of 
trusts had at least four years of data. The years of data for each trust varies due to some trusts coming into inception 
after the start of the observation period, some trusts being acquired prior to the end of the observation period, and 
other trusts diversifying their revenue streams into non-oil and gas assets. In this case, the trust was omitted from the 
observations when a material portion of their cash flow was obtained from non-oil and gas sources. 
 
 
Canadian oil and gas trusts are chosen as the subject of the study for two main reasons. 
First, oil and gas royalty trusts are described as “pure play” oil and gas production firms. Typi-
cally, these entities are more focused on producing reserves out of mature, less risky develop-
ment properties than participating in high-risk exploration plays that require extensive capital. 
This “pure play” characteristic makes them an ideal asset to focus on in this HVP study. Sec-
ondly, no previous HVP papers have used Canadian oil and gas royalty trusts as the basis for 
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their study. Canadian oil and gas royalty trusts have experienced considerable trading volume 
and analyst coverage over this period, which makes them appealing candidates for accurate mar-
ket valuation. 
The oil and gas industry provides some interesting challenges from an economic point of 
view. This stems from the fact that nearly all companies that participate in the industry are in-
volved in both oil and gas extraction. Although somewhat similar, they both have different 
measurement units due to their different states of matter. Oil is typically presented in barrel units 
and gas is presented in cubic feet units. When attempting to perform financial analysis on the 
industry it is most preferred to have the pricing and costing of both commodities separated out. 
However, oil and gas entities tend to aggregate the two units into one variable, barrels of oil 
equivalent, in order to facilitate their reporting requirements. 
Previous studies of the HVP have contained both types of analysis, oil and gas metrics 
separated and oil and gas aggregated into a single unit. In the studies where oil and gas were 
separated, only proxy selling prices and costs were applied to the observations as actual net price 
data was not published. In previous studies where oil and gas were aggregated (gas converted to 
an oil equivalent) the authors used varying conversion factors. Miller and Upton (1985a) used 
5,700 cubic feet (5.7 Mcf) equal to one barrel of oil based on the British thermal unit energy 
conversion factor. Watkins (1992) used 12 Mcf equal to one barrel of oil based on economic 
value at the time. During the sample time, the price for 12 Mcf was approximately equal to the 
value of one barrel of oil. 
For the time period of this study, the conversion process has become more straightfor-
ward. Industry has adopted a 6 Mcf equal to one barrel of oil equivalent conversion factor that 
has been in place over the time period used in this study and all trusts have adhered to this con-
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vention.1 Since all trusts in the sample use this convention, the test is comparable among all of 
the observations. Their selling price, royalties, operating costs, general and administrative costs, 
interest costs and capital taxes are all presented on a barrel of oil equivalent basis. (Note that all 
prices and costs are reported in Canadian dollars.) There is no allocation or split between the two 
commodities. Because all trusts present this way and there is no public information that is broken 
down between oil and gas, the study was performed using a barrel of oil equivalent convention. 
This obviously poses a limitation to performing more specific tests on oil and gas separately. 
 The particular time period for the analysis is chosen because of the proliferation of oil 
and gas royalty trusts combined with the volatile energy prices over the period. Figure 3.1 re-
veals extensive variability in both oil and gas prices over the sample period. The volatility in 
commodity prices seen below provides this study with the ability to obtain robust results as net 
price is a major driver in the regression test. Since costs for each firm are relatively static through 
time, selling price is the biggest factor in varying net price over time. Therefore, having a period 
of higher price volatility allows for a more powerful test of the HVP. In a supplemental test I 
divide my observation period into two groups: limited volatility (2000 - 2002) and large volatil-
ity (2003 - 2006) in order to verify if volatility does indeed contribute to the robustness of the 
analysis. 
 In the last year of this time period, specifically October 31, 2006, the Government of 
Canada proposed to change the tax treatment of income trusts to level the playing field with cor-
porate Canada. The proposed changes would take place in 2011. This announcement seemed to 
have a negative impact on oil and gas royalty trust valuations as the S&P/TSX Capped Energy 
Trust Index declined 13.1% between the close on October 31, 2006 and the close on November 
                                                 
1 National Instrument 51-101 Standards of Disclosure for Oil and Gas Activities, page 12. 
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1, 2006. The announcement does affect the last year of my sample since I use the year-end re-
serves as at December 31, 2006 and the trading prices from the beginning of April to the end of 
May 2007.  However, I retested the data omitting the affected year and the announcement does 
not have a material impact to the conclusions reached in my study. 
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Figure 3.1 Historical Oil and Natural Gas Prices 
This figure illustrates the yearly average price for crude oil (based on Edmonton Light Crude) and natural gas (based 
on AECO) over the observation period. 
 
3.1 DESCRIPTION 
3.1.1 RESERVES 
As publicly traded entities, oil and gas royalty trusts must publish at least annually an estimate of 
their oil and gas reserve assets. These reserve estimates must be prepared by an independent 
qualified reserve evaluator or auditor. Usually the effective date of these reserve estimate reports 
coincide with each trusts’ fiscal year end. In this sample, every trust has a fiscal year end of De-
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cember 31 and all of the reserve reports are as at December 31. Each entity publishes a detailed 
breakout of their reserve estimates in their Annual Information Form. This document is used as 
the source of information for reserves for the study. 
 Although there are some subtle differences among the format each trust used to present 
their reserve estimates, they all contain the information needed to perform the appropriate analy-
sis. Each trust presents the reserves of both oil and gas. However, some disaggregate the oil 
grouping into light and medium oil, heavy oil and natural gas liquids. Natural gas liquids are 
categorized under oil, not natural gas, and consist of the petroleum by-products that come out of 
natural gas extraction. In this study, I aggregate all of the oil products and natural gas liquids into 
the oil category and present them in units of barrels. The natural gas in the reserve reports are 
presented in units of cubic feet. 
 Each trust presents their reserves on a “gross” and a “net” basis. The definition of gross 
means the trusts’ interests (operated and non-operated) before deduction of royalties and without 
including any royalty interest. The term “net” refers to the trust’s interests (operated and non-
operated) after deduction of royalties plus any deduction for royalty interest. For this study, I 
utilize the “net” interest of reserves classification and do not adjust for royalties in the net price 
calculation. If “gross” reserves are used the net price calculation would be adjusted for royalties. 
 Another specification used in the presentation of reserves is pricing. Because reserve es-
timates are based on the concept that they are economically recoverable, a set of pricing and cost 
assumptions are incorporated. If pricing structure is more favourable, more reserves will be eco-
nomically recoverable and a higher number of estimated reserves may be attributed to the entity. 
 Trusts present their reserves using two pricing schedules: forecasted pricing and costs, 
and current pricing and costs. Forecasted pricing and costs are generated by a qualified reserve 
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engineering firm and span out a number of years. Their forecast is based on their best estimate of 
pricing and costs given their knowledge of the energy industry. Constant pricing and cost fore-
casts hold the current profit structure throughout the estimated lives of the properties to which 
the estimate applies. As an example, if the reserve engineer’s price forecast is higher than the 
constant prices, and costs remain the same in both cases, then the reserve estimate may be higher 
since more of the entity’s reserves may be economically recoverable. 
 The reserve categories presented by entities are based on the definitions and guidelines 
contained in the Canadian Oil and Gas Evaluation Handbook (“COGE Handbook”). Currently, 
reserves are separated into two major categories, proved and probable, which are based on the 
likelihood of recovery. Each of these reserve categories is further divided into developed and 
undeveloped reserves, which indicate whether or not the reserve has existing wells and infra-
structure for production. Developed reserves may be further divided into developed producing 
and developed non-producing categories depending on the production status.2 A summary of the 
reserve categorizations as defined by the COGE Handbook is broken out in Figure 3.2. 
 One of the major differences in reserve reporting prior to the adoption of National In-
strument 51-101 was in the presentation of probable reserves. Some of the trusts presented Prob-
able reserves on a “risked” basis which adjusted the probable reserves by 50%. This is similar to 
the new definition. However, some of the trusts presented probable reserves on a “non-risked” 
basis at 100%. In these cases the probable reserves are adjusted by 50% to make them compara-
ble to both other trusts and over time. 
 This test of the HVP utilizes the proved reserves category. As per the COGE Handbook, 
it is likely that at least 90 percent of the quantity of reserves actually recovered will actually 
                                                 
2 Canadian Oil and Gas Evaluation Handbook, (pages 5-13 to 5-15). 
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equal or exceed the estimate. As such, there is minimal risk that that the majority of the reserves 
in this category will not be recovered. 
 
Total
Oil and Gas
Reserves
Proved Reserves
? Reserves that can be estimated with a high 
degree of certainty to be recoverable
? At least 90% probability that the 
quantities actually recovered will equal or 
exceed this estimate
Probable Reserves*
? Additional reserves that are less certain to 
be recovered than Proved Reserves
? At least 50% probability that the 
quantities actually recovered will equal or 
exceed the estimate of proved + probable 
reserves
Proved Developed 
Reserves
? Reserves that are expected to be recovered 
from existing wells and installed facilities 
or from facilities that would involve a low 
expenditure
? The Developed category may be 
subdivided into producing and non-
producing
Proved Undeveloped 
Reserves
? Reserves that are expected to be recovered 
from known accumulations where a 
significant expenditure is required to 
render them capable of production
* The Probable Reserves category can also be split into the Proved Developed and Proved undeveloped categories.  However, it is rare to see the 
Trusts in my sample split out their Probable Reserves into further categories.  In this test, only the Proved Reserves category is used.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Summary of Reserve Classifications 
This figure illustrates the various reserve classifications and sub-categories as defined by the COGE Handbook. The 
major categories are proved reserves and probable reserves. It is common to see proved reserves further divided into 
proved developed reserves and proved undeveloped reserves. Further, proved developed reserves can be further 
refined into proved developed producing and proved developed non-producing.  I incorporate an ancillary test which 
examines the value effect of reserve quality using percentage of proved developed producing reserves as the proxy. 
 
3.1.2 LAND 
All of the trusts used in my sample own undeveloped land (or “unproved properties” under Na-
tional Instrument 51-101) which has not been used by the trusts to produce oil and gas. Since 
undeveloped land is an asset that is not producing, I net its value out of the enterprise value cal-
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culation. The majority of trusts publish a value for this land. For the trusts that do not publish a 
value I allocate $100 per acre to the value, which is a conventional average amount used in the 
industry for land valuation. For example, Sayer Energy Advisors puts out a quarterly summary 
report of merger and acquisition transactions in Canada titled “Canadian Oil Industry Merger and 
Acquisitions Report”. The report allocates $100/acre of value for undeveloped land when there is 
not a specific value for land reported in the transaction information. The specific value allocated 
to land does not have a material impact to the results of my study since the average component of 
land/enterprise value is 2.7% (median 2.2%, maximum 10.2%, minimum 0.3% and standard de-
viation is 2.1%). 
3.1.3 NET PRICE 
In this study I define the term net price as selling price per unit minus the costs associated with 
producing and selling that unit, which include operating costs, general and administrative costs, 
and capital taxes. This definition is similar to the net price used in previous studies of the HVP. 
More specifically, selling price is defined as the amount received by the producer for sell-
ing one barrel of oil equivalent. The selling price varies among each trust due to varying grades 
of the commodity produced (i.e. heavy crude receives a lower price than lighter crude) and vary-
ing combinations of oil and gas. On the cost side, operating cost is defined as all of the costs as-
sociated with extracting the resource from the ground and getting it to market. These include ma-
chinery and equipment costs such as compressors and labour costs that are directly associated 
with the extraction process. (However, this does not include capital costs such as the drilling of 
the well or the installation of pipelines to tie the reserves into main service lines.) Both fixed and 
variable costs are included in this data and the company reports do not differentiate or report 
fixed and variable costs. General and administrative operating costs are associated with the over-
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head of operating a business. This category can include items such as management salaries and 
corporate office rent. Lastly, capital taxes are the only cash tax that trusts in this sample paid 
over the study period. These are usually immaterial in the net price calculation and may consist 
of tax on interest income, property tax and other non-operating items. 
There are two items that are not included in my net price calculation even though they 
have a cash charge. Hedging gains and losses are not included because this study of the HVP is 
based on a cash flow model that uses forecasts and assumptions. With hedging gains and losses it 
is impossible to determine whether the gain or loss in the current period (quarter one) will be 
replicated in future periods. Because of this uncertainty, hedging gains and losses are not in-
cluded in the net price calculation. There is no mention of incorporating or not including them in 
the previous studies. Secondly, interest costs are not included since the net price should not be 
dependent on how the trust is capitalized. 
The definition I use for net price revolves around a cash basis definition. Basically, eve-
rything involved in the selling of oil and gas production that is cash based is included and non-
cash expenses such as depreciation, depletion and amortization are not included. The cash defini-
tion is chosen for net price because it is more suitable to be used in a discounted cash flow 
model, which is the foundation for the HVP theory. As noted previously, royalties payable are 
not taken into consideration into the net price calculation as I use the “net” reserve classification 
which already takes into account an adjustment for royalties. 
The source of the net price information comes from the first quarter financial reports of 
each trust for the sample period. The first quarter financial reports are chosen as a proxy to cur-
rent net price as defined in previous HVP papers. Since reserve reports are effective December 
31 and released to the public in the first quarter, the quarter one financials provide the current net 
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price that most closely coincides with the release of the reserve estimates. 
3.1.4 ENTERPRISE VALUE 
Another item required for this study is the enterprise value for each trust. Enterprise value is de-
fined as market capitalization plus net debt. Net debt is defined as short-term debt plus long-term 
debt minus any cash or cash equivalents. By using enterprise value as the main value metric I 
incorporate any leverage the trust may be incorporating through the use of debt. This is because 
the HVP is based on overall firm value, which includes both equity and debt. 
3.1.4.a MARKET CAPITALIZATION 
Market capitalization in this study is defined as units outstanding multiplied by the appropriate 
unit price. For unit price the average daily closing price between the beginning of April to the 
end of May for each year is used. This time period is chosen for several reasons. First, the use of 
an average in the study eliminates any short-term volatility that may occur on specific days. Sec-
ondly, the March to May time frame is chosen as this period reflects both the most recent reserve 
reports and the first quarter net prices, which are published in the quarter one financial reports. 
The source of information for the units is the trusts’ quarter one financial reports. The unit price 
data is retrieved from two sources, GlobeinvestorGOLD and Bloomberg. GlobeinvestorGOLD is 
used for most sources but it does not have historical unit prices for three trusts that were acquired 
prior to the end of the study’s sample period. Therefore, Bloomberg is used to get data for these 
three trusts. 
3.1.4.b NET DEBT 
The source for the net debt data is the balance sheet for each trust found in their respective quar-
ter one financial statements. Some of the trusts have convertible debentures as part of their capi-
tal structure. Even though there is potential for equity dilution if converted, I treat them as a debt 
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security and include them in the net debt calculation. 
Although the data is taken from pre-specified points in time (i.e. reserves at year-end, 
units outstanding and net debt at the end of quarter one) I adjusted the appropriate variable if 
there is a material change in the entity. For instance, if a trust completed an acquisition of prop-
erties in March, I would add the acquired reserves to the firm’s original reserves. The balance 
sheet would not need to be adjusted since I use Q1 data and the source of funds for the acquisi-
tion would already be adjusted at that time point. Many of the trusts completed an acquisition, 
sale, or equity issue in the first quarter. Out of the 107 observations, 21 are adjusted due to a ma-
terial corporate announcement. 
 
3.2 DATA COLLECTION PROCESS 
This study utilizes data that was collected piece-by-piece and adjusted where appropriate. For 
each observation, there were many public filings to access and many press releases to filter 
through in order to get an accurate reflection of the state of the company.  
As an example, the collection process begins with extracting the reserve report informa-
tion found in the Annual Information Form filing. This also has the land holdings data and all the 
information is at December 31. To be precise, reserve data based on constant pricing and net af-
ter royalties is utilized in this test and land holding are based on the land that is not currently de-
veloped into an area that is captured under a reserve report. The reserves are input in detailed 
categories so their composition can be studied for other effects. For instance, although the proved 
category is used in the study, the data is inputted in three different categories of proved reserves: 
proved developed producing, proved developed non-producing, and proved undeveloped. And, 
within each of those groups, I input the volume of oil reserves and the volume of gas reserves 
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separately. 
Obtaining information from the first quarter financial statements is the next step. From 
these I obtain two important components: cash flow breakdown and the capitalization of the 
trust. The cash flow components are broken into different categories including selling price, op-
erating cost, overhead cost, and capital taxes, if any. Each of these items is input separately. On 
the capitalization side I get units outstanding, long-term debt, short-term debt, and the cash bal-
ance. All of these items are dated at the end of each first quarter. In order to calculate market 
capitalization, and hence enterprise value, I average the daily closing unit prices from the end of 
March to the end of May. 
The last element of the data collection process is crucial in getting an accurate reflection 
of value. Many of the observations were adjusted for an event that occurred during the observa-
tion time that impacted either the reserves or capitalization. I check all the press releases that are 
distributed from December 31 to the end of May to verify whether there are any items that affect 
one or both of these categories. If so, the appropriate alteration is made to the data to accurately 
reflect how the market would be valuing the entity. Although time consuming, this process al-
lows for the incorporation of the most accurately specified data for testing. A list of the adjust-
ments made to my observations can be found in Appendix A3. 
 
3.3 DATASET CHARACTERISTICS 
Table 3.2 outlines the characteristics of the 107 observations utilized in the study. The size of the 
trusts studied (based on enterprise value) range from $72.8 million to $7,751.0 million with debt 
levels ranging from a net cash position of $28.0 million to a net debt position of $1,681.0 mil-
lion. Leverage levels average 16% with maximum leverage being 32%. Reserve volumes range 
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from a low of 11 million BOE’s to a maximum 335 million BOE’s with an average of 97 million 
BOEs. The reserve composition is fairly balanced with natural gas as a percentage of reserves 
averaging 47%. This ranges from a minimum of 1% to a maximum of 86% natural gas. The most 
interesting component of the table compares the trading value versus the current net price. This 
comparison looks at the two components that make up the HVP: value per reserve unit and net 
price. The ratio in the far right column reveals an average of 65% which means trading value 
understates net price by 35% on average. If the HVP held true this ratio should be close to 100%. 
Variability on all of the columns is somewhat limited, especially examining the ratios on the 
right part of the table. Standard deviation is in the $8 range for both trading value per reserve 
unit and net price. 
 
Table 3.2 Dataset Descriptive Statistics 
Total Capitalization Debt Reserves Value HOTEL Ratio
Market Net Enterprise Debt/ BOE EV/ Cash Flow Value/
Cap. Debt Value (EV) EV Reserves Gas Reserves Net Price HOTEL
($mm) ($mm) ($mm) (%) (mBOE) (%) ($/boe) ($/boe) (%)
Mean 1,428.0$      251.3$         1,679.3$      16% 96,852      47% $21.54 $34.08 65%
Median 1,046.0$      216.6$         1,303.0$      17% 80,853      45% $20.48 $35.56 68%
Standard Deviation 1,344.3$      230.5$         1,520.1$      8% 75,660      20% $8.83 $8.87 22%
Minimum 66.9$           (28.0)$          72.8$           -9% 11,135      1% $5.14 $12.79 18%
Maximum 7,225.1$      1,681.0$      7,751.0$      32% 335,580    86% $43.58 $56.21 125%
 
Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics for the sample used in the study. The statistics are specific to each column 
and not on an entity basis. The three columns at the right represent the market value per reserve unit, the current net 
price per unit, and the ratio of the former, respectively.  
 
 In addition to examining the dataset characteristics, I also review the value and net price 
growth rates over the period of my study. The results show that both the average value and net 
price grow at 16% which would typically be at or higher than the discount rate for oil and gas 
royalty trusts. This would typically mean that a higher value should be reflected in the market for 
these entities. It is interesting to note that value actually seems to be catching up to net price in 
the later years however, the results presented in Table 3.3 must be taken with caution due to the 
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short time frame.  
 
Table 3.3 Value and Net Price Growth Rates 
Enterprise Value (EV) Net Price Ratio
Weighted Growth Weighted Growth EV/
Year Average Rate Average Rate Net Price
($/boe) (%) ($/boe) (%) (%)
2000 $12.17 $37.40 33%
2001 $12.13 0% $14.87 -60% 82%
2002 $13.86 14% $37.31 151% 37%
2003 $18.91 36% $30.43 -18% 62%
2004 $22.45 19% $35.62 17% 63%
2005 $31.26 39% $42.30 19% 74%
2006 $27.62 -12% $38.35 -9% 72%
Average 16% 16% 60%  
Table 3.3 shows the average enterprise value per boe and average net prices weighted by quantity of Proved Re-
serves for each year in my study. Both the value and net price rise 16% on average over the period and value as a 
percent of net price is 60% on average. However, due to the short time frame studied and the high volatility, the 
average growth rates must be taken with caution.  
 
 
 
3.4 INCOME TRUST OVERVIEW 
 
An income trust, although publicly traded, differs from a regular public corporation with com-
mon shares in two distinct ways. First, the structure of an income trust makes it conducive to 
disbursing much of its generated cash flow into the hands of its investors. Conversely, regular 
public corporations tend to retain the majority of their generated cash flow to fund further capital 
projects and reinvestment opportunities. Income trusts, with their usual steady cash distribution 
(although by no means fixed), are comparable to a debt instrument that pays out a regular distri-
bution (interest payment). This feature makes income trusts popular among income-oriented in-
vestors. The second major characteristic that sets them apart is their taxation structures. Holders 
of typical common shares face a double taxation regime. First, companies are taxed at a corpo-
rate level and then the common share holder is taxed on a personal level. Income trusts, on the 
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other hand, are structured to allow taxation to occur only at the unit holder level, and at this 
level, distributions are taxed as ordinary income. The Royalty Trust structure, although similar to 
income trusts, is limited to domestic Canadian resource properties under Canadian legislation. 
Income trusts on the other hand have no specific restrictions on the assets they hold. 
 As indicated earlier, a common theme among income trusts and royalty trusts is the dis-
tribution of nearly 100% of cash flow. Only minimal amounts are retained to reinvest in deplet-
ing assets. As an example, capital required for maintenance and development projects is usually 
paid with debt and then replaced with a follow-on equity issue. This payout of cash flow is simi-
lar and can be compared to the payout of an annuity since both have a limited life and a declining 
capital base. 
 Another characteristic of oil and gas royalty trusts is their declining asset base. Each day, 
as oil and gas units are pumped out of the ground, the reserve declines. This is in contrast to real 
estate investment trusts where the asset base is characterized by a much longer useful life. The 
declining asset base of oil and gas royalty trusts complemented with high cash flow payout ratios 
implies that cash flow would decline over time. However, oil and gas royalty trusts have histori-
cally reversed this trend through acquisitions. 
 Figure 3.3 shows the two primary components of the royalty trust structure, the trust and 
the operating company. The process for creating a royalty trust still begins with the formation of 
a corporation; however, the subsequent steps are very different. First, an operating corporation 
(“OPCO”) is created that will take ownership of the assets (mainly oil and gas reserves). Then, a 
trust (“TRUST”) is created and an offering of trust units is carried out through an initial public 
offering. Proceeds from the offering are used to buy a royalty of income from OPCO. OPCO 
uses the proceeds from the royalty purchase (plus debt financing, if any) to purchase the oil and 
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gas assets. The price paid for the royalty interest by TRUST to OPCO is substantially the same 
amount as the price paid for the assets less any debt. Finally, the purchase of the royalty by the 
TRUST results in the TRUST receiving 99% of OPCO’s net cash flow (with 1% being retained 
by OPCO to qualify as a business). To summarize, the trust units own a 99% interest in the as-
sets. 
 
Trust Units Common Shares and Management Agreement
Unitholder
•owns Trust units which represent full 
economic interest in the underlying oil 
and gas assets
MANAGECO
•owns common equity of OPCO and 
manages the business pursuant to 
management agreement
TRUST
•Purchases royalty from OPCO with proceeds from trust unit 
issues
•Tax Pools equal the price of the Royalty
•Price of the Royalty equals the price of the oil and gas assets 
less the amount of additional debt assumed by the OPCO
•Royalty entitles Trust to 99% of net cash flow from assets 
which is taxed in the hands of the unitholder
OPCO
•Purchases oil and gas assets and sells 99% royalty to the 
trust – retains 1% to qualify as a business
•Finances the purchase of assets with proceeds from Trust 
Unit issue plus additional bank debt
•Net cash flow generated by assets qualifies as income of the 
Trust NOT of the OPCO due to Royalty
•Effectively no income tax paid by OPCO
99% Royalty
•Entitled to receive 
99% of Net Cash 
Flow from Assets
Working Interest
•mature, producing oil 
and gas assets
Oil and Gas Assets
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Oil and Gas Royalty Trust Structure3
This figure illustrates the two primary components of the royalty trust structure: the trust and the operating com-
pany.  
 
OPCO and the TRUST are managed by a separate entity (“MANAGECO”). The com-
pensation of MANAGECO is usually paid through a combination of management fees based on 
                                                 
3 Panarites (2000) 
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operating metrics, acquisition and disposition fees, incentive fees and general and administrative 
costs reimbursement. More recently, MANAGECOs have been “internalized” into the trusts and 
operate within the trust rather than through a separate entity. 
 Tax implications from a trust structure occur at both the corporate and the personal level. 
At a corporate level, the income generated by the assets (99% of the income) is received by the 
TRUST, not OPCO. This occurs as OPCO passes through the income generated to the TRUST 
and is effectively a tax deductible expense of OPCO. Debt is used by OPCO to maximize royalty 
income. A significant portion of OPCO capital expenditures are financed with debt (rather than 
retained earnings) and the debt proceeds offset the capital spending in calculating royalty in-
come. Therefore, if capital expenditures are 100% debt financed, the cash flow of OPCO is es-
sentially equal to the royalty income. Over time, debt is replaced with new equity issues usually 
in conjunction with an acquisition in order to keep unit holder dilution to a minimum. 
At the personal level, a tax pool is created at the TRUST level when the TRUST pur-
chases the 99% royalty interest from OPCO. These pools allow for the sheltering of the distribu-
tion paid to unit holders from personal income tax. The sheltered component is categorized as a 
return of capital which in turn reduces the unit holders’ asset base. This allows for a tax deferral 
as tax is applied to the capital gain, if any, when the unit is sold. If the investor’s cost base goes 
to zero, the distribution will qualify as regular income. In order to offset the potential of investors 
facing a zero cost base, the TRUST, through OPCO, can continually make acquisitions to refill 
the tax pool. 
In an attempt to give a better understanding of royalty trusts I expose some of the major 
differences between a conventional oil and gas production company and an oil and gas royalty 
trust through Figure 3.4. Although the diagram is highly simplified, it does provide the major 
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taxation and operating differences between the two structures. It also shows that the major ad-
vantages of the royalty trust structure are single taxation and stable return of investment through 
(somewhat) predictable distributions, although these distributions are not fixed. On the other 
hand the advantages of the corporate structure are the potential for a big payoff and share appre-
ciation. The federal government has legislated that only resource properties can be held under the 
royalty trust structure while there are no restrictions on the type of assets that can be placed in 
income trusts. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Royalty Trust Structure versus Conventional Corporate Structure 
This figure illustrates the major corporate structure differences between a conventional company with common 
shareholders versus an oil and gas royalty trust with unit holders. 
Oil and Gas Reserves
ROYALTY TRUST
Unitholder
Investment in Royalty 
Trust to gain 
ownership and piece 
of distribution stream
Distribution based on 
cash flown generated 
by Royalty Trust
Minimal 
Reinvestment as cash 
flow is paid to 
Unitholder
(reinvestment mainly 
contingent on new 
equity issue)
Cash Flow from 
extraction of oil and 
gas
Oil and Gas Reserves
CONVENTIONAL 
EXPLORATION AND 
PRODUCTION COMPANY
Common Share Holder
Investment in 
Exploration and 
Production Company
Distribution through 
dividend is rare; 
Shareholder looking 
for share price 
appreciation through 
Company value-add
High reinvestment in 
producing properties 
and potential 
properties
Cash Flow from 
extraction of oil and 
gas
Signifies where taxation occurs
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The main difference between the two structures is the process of transferring net cash 
flow from OPCO to the TRUST in a tax efficient manner. Under the royalty trust structure, net 
cash flow in the form of royalty income is earned by the TRUST’s 99% net cash flow royalty 
and the royalties are essentially a tax deductible expense of OPCO. On the other hand, under an 
income trust structure where the TRUST owns all of the debt and equity of OPCO, cash travels 
from OPCO to the TRUST in the form of interest and dividends. Since equity is usually mini-
mized and debt maximized, most of the transfer occurs in tax deductible interest payments. 
 The creation of the royalty trust structure breathed new life into mature, stable assets that 
may have been on the edge of being uneconomical. Previously, these assets did not garner near 
the amount of attention that they do now with the royalty trust structure. This royalty trust struc-
ture brought attention to these assets on two fronts: 
1. The tax advantage of putting these types of assets in the royalty trust structure made these 
assets more economically viable. 
2. These assets, when put in a royalty trust structure, created an investment vehicle that at-
tracted income oriented investors who also wanted to participate in an equity play. 
The above reasons opened up a new world of capital for these assets which in turn allowed the 
assets to be efficiently exploited. 
From an investor standpoint, the benefits of the royalty trust structure are straightforward. 
The tax advantage is the main benefit as taxation only occurs at the personal level and not at the 
corporate level. Secondly, the regular disbursement of cash flows generated by the business al-
lows for income oriented investors to receive a regular payment. Furthermore, non-income ori-
ented investors always have the option of reinvesting the distribution back into the royalty trust. 
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CHAPTER 4   METHODOLOGY 
 
The methodology used to test the HVP must incorporate a proxy for value along with data for the 
current net price. This test utilizes market value of equity plus book value of debt as the proxy 
for reserve value. The market value is regressed onto the net price to test the net price’s ability to 
explain value. In addition to including net price as an independent factor, I also run additional 
tests incorporating other potential drivers of value including real option value, oil weighting, re-
serve quality, and size to see their impact, if any. Also, other test specifications are examined to 
further test for robustness of the HVP. 
 
4.1 BACKGROUND 
Fundamental valuation is based on the cash flow generation abilities of an asset or entity. Hotel-
ling (1931) applied cash flow methodology to the valuation of exhaustible natural resources. The 
derivation process of Hotelling’s (1931) theory is as follows. 
The value of an exhaustible natural resource reserve can be calculated by taking the ex-
pected cash generated in each year into the future and discounting each year back at the appro-
priate rate,  
( )∑
∞
= +
−=
0
0 1
)(
t
t
t
ttt
r
qcpV ,     (4.1) 
where V0 is the current value, t is the time of cash flow, p is the selling price per unit, c is the 
extraction cost per unit, q is the quantity extracted and sold at time t, and r is the fair discount 
rate. 
A resource owner will want to maximize the value but is obviously constrained by the 
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overall quantity of reserves (R) they have in their possession. Therefore,  
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where R is the total reserve quantity. 
The Hotelling (1931) Equation 2.1 states that in equilibrium, the net price is expected to 
grow at the discount rate. Put another way, the present value of the net price at any future time 
must equal the current net price,  
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Substituting this into Equation 4.1 gives 
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Assuming that all of the reserves are eventually extracted, or equivalently by considering only 
economically viable reserves, Equation 4.2 will hold with equality. This implies 
( )
0000 RcpV −= .     (4.5) 
There are a number of issues that could lead to the failure of Equation 4.5 for a particular 
firm. The first is Hotelling’s (1931) theory itself. Since the argument for its validity hinges upon 
economic equilibrium, it applies more naturally to a global setting rather than firm specific cases. 
This implies that the extraction cost that the principle applies should be considered an industry 
average, or rather a threshold. Firms with a cost advantage should extract more quickly, and 
those with a cost disadvantage should defer extraction. 
 Other issues involve the derivation of Equation 4.3. These involve the independence be-
tween price, cost, and quantity extracted. The independence of price and quantity results from 
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the perfectly competitive market assumption. However, even in that case it seems likely that a 
firm’s extraction costs would depend on the quantity extracted. Furthermore, even if price and 
cost do not depend directly on the quantity, the stochastic nature of the problem implies that 
Equation 4.3 requires the future variables to be stochastically uncorrelated with each other. Intui-
tively, this suggests that the firm makes its extraction decision independently of the net price it 
faces, which seems unreasonable. Any of these issues will cause Equation 4.5 to fail.  
 
4.2 TEST OF THE HOTELLING VALUATION PRINCIPLE 
For this study I perform a test of the HVP and also further the study by incorporating other po-
tentially value impacting variables and completing ancillary tests. 
 Rearranging Equation 4.5 gives value per unit of reserves, 
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Miller and Upton (1985a) adapt this equation into the linear regression model 
( ) ucp
R
V +−+= 00
0
0 βα  .    (4.7) 
If the HVP is valid, the intercept should be α = 0 and the slope should be β = 1. My study of the 
HVP using Canadian oil and gas royalty trusts uses a slightly modified version of the above re-
gression equation. The modification allows me to test whether β  = 0 rather than β  = 1 and is 
specified as 
( ) ( ) ititititititit ucpcpRV +−+=−− 000000 βα ,   (4.8) 
where i represents cross section and t represents time series. 
In order to run the regression, each trust’s current net price is used as the independent 
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variable and enterprise value per unit of reserve less the net price as the dependant variable. The 
dependant variable is a product of taking each trust’s total enterprise value (adjusted for any un-
developed land value), dividing it by the total proved reserves outstanding for each entity and 
then subtracting the net price.  
In order to improve on the estimation efficiency in my testing I also utilize the general-
ized least squares (GLS) method in addition to the ordinary least squares (OLS) method since my 
dataset consists of a cross sectional times series of unbalanced panel data with the potential for 
unequal variances and/or correlation. The GLS method attempts to adjust for autocorrelation in 
the time series and missing factors that have a common effect on the dependent variable in the 
panel data. It does this by utilizing a different weighting matrix on the error term. 
In particular, I assume that the covariance between residuals is 
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The regression is estimated using a two-stage least squares procedure, in which the correlation ρ 
is the estimated correlation of the appropriate residuals obtained through OLS. The second stage 
uses this estimate for the GLS covariance matrix. 
This process is performed for all 22 Canadian oil and gas royalty trusts in the sample over 
the years in which they operated since 2000 for a total of 107 observations. This process of test-
ing for a one-to-one relationship between net price and reserve value will determine whether the 
HVP holds for Canadian oil and gas royalty trusts. 
 
4.3 ADDITIONAL POTENTIAL VALUE DRIVERS 
In addition to performing the main regression, additional variables are included in ancillary tests 
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to see if they have any impact. I include variables relating to real options, as well as variables 
controlling for commodity mix, reserve quality, and firm size. These additional independent 
variables are layered in to the regression model and both the individual independent variables 
and the equations are tested for significance.  
4.3.1 REAL OPTIONS 
The management of oil and gas companies are always being faced with capital planning deci-
sions. For example, after finding a new discovery, they can produce the newly found pool imme-
diately or they can choose to delay to take advantage of improving economics in the future. This 
ability to choose the timing of extraction has inherent value - real option value. For instance, the 
more volatility there is in the selling price of oil and gas the more “potential” value there is in 
reserves held by a company. In particular, when prices are high, the firm can expand production. 
I account for this by incorporating a call option proxy. As stated earlier in McCormack and Sick 
(2001), real option value has not been implemented widely into practice and many companies 
lack incentive to management to focus on this value. However, I do test for this inherent value in 
this study using the Black-Scholes model for option valuation. The model utilizes an at-the-
money call option and is specified in Table 4.1. I transform the estimated option price using the 
natural logarithm, which helps linearize an otherwise strictly positive variable. The specification 
for the real option test included in this study is: 
LN (Black-Scholes Option Value).   (4.10) 
If the HVP holds, the real option variable should not be significant. Conversely, since the HVP 
only captures the deterministic elements, the real option will allow me to test for the stochastic 
factors which I believe are present in the oil and gas industry. 
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Table 4.1 Real Option Specification 
Call Option 
of Common Share 
Option Value on Oil 
and Gas Reserves Variable Utilized 
Underlying Share Price Net Price Specific Net Price for each Trust 
Strike Price Net Price Specific Net Price for each Trust 
Time to Expiry Period of Volatility Test 62 trading days (90 calendar days) 
Risk Free Rate Risk Free Rate 90 day Government of Canada Bond 
Share Price Return Volatility Oil/Gas Net Price* Return Volatility 
Standard Deviation of the Natural 
Log of the daily Oil/Gas Net 
Price* Returns (Weighted for each 
Trust) for the First Quarter of 
Each Year 
 
Table 4.1 is a comparison of the assumptions used in the valuation of a call option on a common share using the 
Black-Scholes model and the assumption used in the valuation of a real call option for oil and gas reserves. The 
table also includes the assumptions used for each input. 
* The Net Price volatility calculation is based on posted sales prices as costs are assumed constant over the three 
month period. 
 
4.3.2 ISOLATING OTHER DATA CHARACTERISTICS 
Although quantity of reserves and net price received for those reserves should be the major 
driver in value for oil and gas companies, I suspect there may be some other factors that also 
have an influence on value. I include oil versus gas weighting, quality of reserves, and size in my 
ancillary test to determine their impact on value.  
1. Oil and Gas Weighting 
One of the major issues brought up repeatedly when studying the HVP is the issue of gas 
conversion factors for equating gas into an oil equivalent. By adding a proxy for the oil 
weight I am able to determine whether there is an impact to value based on what commodity, 
oil or gas, the trust possesses. A logarithmic transformation is used to linearize the variable, 
so the proxy variable used is calculated as 
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( )[ ]ppLN −1/ ,     (4.11) 
where p = proportion of oil in each trust’s proved reserves. The proportion is calculated using 
the contemporaneous conversion factor (based on average first quarter selling prices of oil 
and gas) and not the industry convention of 6:1 in order to more accurately reflect the current 
pricing environment.4  If gas is less valuable than what the 6:1 ratio warrants (such as 7:1 or 
8:1 as appears in Figure 3.1), then the coefficient should be positive. 
2. Proved Developed Producing Reserves as a Percentage of Total Reserves 
The classification of reserves into categories required by regulators provides a unique oppor-
tunity to examine the effects of reserve quality on the regression equation. Although the HVP 
uses quantity of reserves as one of its variables, it is not known what category of reserves 
best reflects this quantity. Similar to this test, previous studies have also used the proved re-
serves category for their tests. However, there may be potential positive value impact if a 
greater proportion of the reserves in the proved category are classified as proved developed 
producing as opposed to proved developed non-producing or proved undeveloped. My test 
for this is similar to the oil weighting proportion test, 
( )[ ]ppLN −1/ ,     (4.12) 
where p = proportion of proved developed producing reserves in each trust’s proved reserves. 
If the HVP holds and costs are accurately reflected, then the proved developed producing 
weighting variable should not be significant. However, if fixed costs are mistakenly amor-
tized into variable extraction costs, then the coefficient should be positive. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 I repeated the analysis using the conventional 6:1 conversion factor and the results were similar. 
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3. Size (Enterprise Value) 
There is a general understanding that entity size plays a part in valuation. It is believed that 
larger companies demand a premium valuation over their smaller peers due to the fact their 
shares may have more trading liquidity, they have improved access to capital, and they are 
seen as a more stable investment. In order to test for size effects in this study, I include the 
variable 
( )sizeLN ,      (4.13) 
where size is represented by enterprise value. If the HVP holds, the size variable should not 
be significant. 
To summarize the relationships among the variables included in the tests I include Table 
4.2 which shows the correlation among the added variables, in their form included in the test, for 
the full time period. The table shows that the real option variable shows the most correlation with 
net price.  
 
Table 4.2 Correlation between the Independent Variable Proxies 
Net Price Real Call Oil PDP
($/boe) Option Value Weighting Weighting Size
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5
X1 1.0000
X2 0.7275 1.0000
X3 -0.2893 -0.3876 1.0000
X4 -0.1159 0.1219 -0.1377 1.0000
X5 0.3544 -0.0294 -0.0974 -0.1776 1.0000  
 
Table 4.2 shows the correlations between the independent variable proxies utilized in the study. The results show 
that the real option proxy is highly correlated with net price. 
 
4.4 ADDITIONAL ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
Further tests are run on the data to obtain a better understanding of the dynamics among the data 
and the model and to test for robustness. Specifically, I test for the impact of commodity price 
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volatility, the impact of price and cost separately on value rather than combined into net price, 
the impact of any nonlinearities through the addition of a squared net price term, and also look at 
a log transformation test to verify if Miller and Upton’s (1985a) specification remains robust. 
4.4.1 COMMODITY PRICE VOLATILITY 
Miller and Upton (1985b) put partial blame on their weakened test results on lack of commodity 
price volatility. The period I use in my study contains volatile oil and gas prices as can be seen in 
Figure 3.1. Oil price nearly doubles over the time period while natural gas more than doubles 
over the period. However, upon closer examination of Figure 3.1, you can see that the period can 
be divided into a period of relatively flat pricing (2000 - 2002) and extremely volatile pricing 
(2003 - 2006). These two periods give me an ideal structure to test the impact of flat versus vola-
tile prices on the test results. 
4.4.2 SEPARATING NET PRICE INTO STAND-ALONE PRICE AND COST 
I run an ancillary test on the data to test the significance of selling price and extraction cost sepa-
rately to see if this provides a better explanation of value than using them combined in one vari-
able, net price. Reiterating Equation (4.6), the HVP states  
00
0
0 cp
R
V −= .     (4.14) 
Rather than considering net price to be a single variable and arriving at regression equation (4.7), 
one could argue that both price and cost could be considered separate variables, which leads to 
the regression equation 
ucp
R
V +β+β+α= 0201
0
0  .    (4.15) 
In this case the HVP would require α = 0, β1 = 1, and β2 = –1. If either of the variables are sig-
nificantly different on their own, then support for the HVP would further be weakened. 
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4.4.3 TESTING FOR NONLINEARITIES IN THE RELATIONSHIP 
In order to test for nonlinearities in the original Hotelling relationship I include a squared net 
price term.  Potential nonlinearities may arise from two main sources: real options, which in-
crease value when net price is low, so value should be higher than net price when it is low; and 
extraction constraints, which reduce value when net price is high (and presumably not going to 
grow as fast), so value should be lower than net price when it is high.  The regression equation to 
test for nonlinearities with a squared net price term is 
( ) ( ) ucpcp
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4.4.4 APPLYING A NATURAL LOGARITHM TEST 
In order to further test the strength of Hotelling’s (1931) assumptions I transform the regression 
test into a natural logarithm specification. Since value, reserve quantity, and net prices are posi-
tive, taking the logarithm of both sides of Equation (4.14) would still describe the HVP, 
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Crain and Jamal (1991) adopt this equation into the linear regression model 
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The main effect from this transformation is to mitigate the contribution of very large or very 
small net price observations. It is not unreasonable to suppose that a larger net price could be 
associated with a more variable residual term. The logarithmic transformation helps resolve that 
problem. 
The logarithm test is performed on all the specified tests including the main test (all ob-
servations), the real option test, the control variables test (oil weighting, reserve quality, and 
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size), and a test on all the variables. The logarithm test is also performed on the period splits 
(2000 - 2002 versus 2003 - 2006) to see if there are varying results between the two periods. 
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CHAPTER 5   STATISTICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
  
The statistical results and analysis of the HVP tests using Canadian oil and gas royalty trusts are 
presented in this section. In addition to presenting the study progression from the original Hotel-
ling specification, I examine the results of incorporating other potential variables including real 
options, commodity mix, reserve quality, and size in the detailed analysis section. 
 
5.1 STUDY PROGRESSION 
The regressions ran according to the original Hotelling specification (where only net price is the 
explanatory variable for reserve value) do not provide affirmative results in support of the HVP. 
In Table 5.1 under both the linear and natural logarithm regressions, the net price coefficient is 
significantly less than zero, indicating that value is less than that predicted by the HVP. 
 
Table 5.1 Original Hotelling Specification 
Intercept Net Price
Test Obs Variables X0 X1 rho R
2
F SSR
FULL RESTRICTION 24,391         
Original (Linear)
OLS 107 2 3.1414 -0.4599 0.0000 0.2946 167.3390 5,825           
0.2764              0.0000              
GLS 107 2 6.9315 -0.5854 0.4748 0.4160 213.0449 4,822           
0.0705              0.0000              0.0000              
Original (Natural Logarithm)
OLS 107 2 0.5120 -0.2923 0.0000 0.2568 94.6480 15.7460
0.2157              0.0144              
GLS 107 2 0.5859 -0.3214 0.4697 0.3911 127.0818 12.9021
0.2997              0 0.0463              0.0000              
es
 
 
Table 5.1 provides a summary of the results from the original Hotelling specification regression which includes net 
price as the only independent variable.  The net price coefficients (in the OLS and GLS versions of the linear and 
natural logarithm regressions) are significantly different from zero which goes against the theory. The p-values for 
each coefficient are directly below. 
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 To further the understanding, I isolate price and cost into their own independent variables 
rather than combining them into net price.  This allows me to see if each one has an impact on its 
own. Table 5.2 shows that only the price variables are significant and their signs are positive as 
expected.  This may give some support for the HVP since costs are relatively constant. Overall, 
the regression with the variables broken out does a slightly better job of explaining value versus 
the original specification where net price is used. 
 
Table 5.2 Regression Results on Price and Cost Isolated 
Intercept Price Cost
Test Obs Variables X0 X1 X2 rho R
2
F SSR
FULL RESTRICTION 24,391         
Price / Cost Split
OLS 107 3 -2.5423 0.5372 0.0675 0.0000 0.3328 118.8188 5,509           
0.4871              0.0000              0.7966              
GLS 107 3 5.4860 0.4365 -0.3626 0.4204 0.4584 154.4089 4,472           
0.2828              0.0001              0.0562              
es
 
 
Table 5.2 provides a summary of the results from the regression run on price and cost separately, versus combined in 
a net price independent variable as per the Hotelling (1931) specification. The price coefficients are the only vari-
ables that are significant. The p-values for each coefficient are directly below. 
  
 Furthermore, I add an additional variable, squared net price, to the original Hotelling 
specification to test for nonlinearities in the relationship.  The results in Table 5.3 show that the 
squared net price term is not significantly different from zero which means there is a lack of evi-
dence for a nonlinear relationship.  Also, the addition of a squared net price variable does not add 
any material explanatory power to value over the original Hotelling specification. This suggests 
that a more careful examination about the failure of the HPV is warranted. 
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Table 5.3 Regression Results of including a Squared Net Price Term 
Intercept Net Price Net Price2
Test Obs Variables X0 X1 X2 rho R
2
F SSR
FULL RESTRICTION 24,391         
Net Price + Net Price2
OLS 107 3 9.5751 0.0793 0.0075 0.0000 0.3021 112.0538 5,763           
0.1580              0.8586              0.2933              
GLS 107 3 -0.4639 0.8730 -0.0066 0.4462 0.4438 149.4492 4,592           
0.9581              0.0882              0.3624              
es
 
Table 5.3 provides a summary of the results from the regression which tests for nonlinearity in the relationship.  The 
squared net price term is not significantly different from zero signifying that a nonlinear relationship does not exist. 
The p-values for each coefficient are directly below. 
 
5.2 DETAILED ANALYSIS 
Table 5.4 presents the statistical results of the HVP regression run on a sample of 22 Canadian 
oil and gas royalty trusts spanning a period from 2000 to 2006 with 107 observations in total. 
The regression test results of the original Hotelling specification study do not show support for 
the HVP using both the OLS and the GLS regression methods. Although the intercept is not sta-
tistically different from zero based on p-value, the slope coefficient is negative, and significantly 
different from zero. (Recall that I adjusted the dependent variable so that the appropriate re-
stricted value for the HVP would be zero, so the negative coefficient implies that reserve value is 
less than current extraction value. However, because the coefficient is greater than –1, reserve 
value is increasing with the net price as expected.) The study shows that the independent variable 
(net price) explains just over 29% of the movement in the dependent variable (market value) 
based on OLS and over 41% based on GLS (together with the estimate of the contemporaneous 
correlation, rho). 
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Table 5.4 - Full Period Test Statistics
Main Option Other Variables
Real Oil PDP
Call Weight Weight Size
Intercept Net Price Option Proxy Proxy Proxy
Test Obs Variables X0 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 rho R
2
F SSRes
FULL RESTRICTION 24,391       
Original Hotelling Specification
OLS 107 2 3.1414 -0.4599 0.0000 0.2946 167.3390 5,825         
0.2764            0.0000            
GLS 107 2 6.9315 -0.5854 0.4748 0.4160 213.0449 4,822         
0.0705            0.0000            0.0000
With Real Call Option
OLS 107 3 -2.8306 0.0632 -11.8594 0.0000 0.5119 175.1415 4,030         
0.2704 0.5398 0.0000
GLS 107 3 1.7482 -0.2429 -6.3088 0.1713 0.5574 196.7184 3,654         
0.6188 0.0981 0.0123 0.0015
With Other
OLS 107 5 -11.5714 -0.6010 -0.3072 -2.5004 2.9908 0.0000 0.4134 82.3258 4,844         
0.0363 0.0000 0.6240 0.1341 0.0001
GLS 107 5 7.6826 -0.6478 -0.9857 1.5028 0.1148 0.2301 0.5552 115.0618 3,673         
0.1873 0.0000 0.0562 0.2779 0.8649 0.0000
With All Variables
OLS 107 6 -7.2712 -0.0400 -11.7995 -1.3929 -0.3823 1.2061 0.0000 0.5565 95.2801 3,662         
0.1349 0.7453 0.0000 0.0178 0.7985 0.0982
GLS 107 6 4.3970 -0.1761 -10.5783 -1.7712 1.1389 -0.1195 0.1528 0.6049 109.0137 3,263         
0.4128 0.2265 0.0002 0.0019 0.4013 0.8608 0.0007
Table 5.4 presents the results of the OLS and GLS regression variations based on Y = X0 + B 1 X1 + … + B 5 X5 where X0 represent the intercept, X1 represents net price per unit (the main test variable for Hotelling
theory), X2 represents the logarithmic real call option proxy, X3 represents the oil weighting proxy, X4 represents the reserve quality proxy and X5 represents the size proxy.  The regressions are run on the Canadian
oil and gas royalty trust data for the period 2000 - 2006 and the p-values are directly below the coefficients.  Although the original Hotelling specification does not show support for the Hotelling theory, the
regressions with the real call option proxy and with all variables do show support for the theory.
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 Potential reasons for the lower than expected slope coefficient may be that market par-
ticipants generally believe that net prices will rise at less than the fair discount rate and the de-
cline rate limits the maximum rate of extraction so that a significant amount of the reserve cannot 
be quickly extracted. Or perhaps it may be due to the market not believing that the independent 
engineers are providing an accurate estimate of reserves and are instead over estimating the 
quantity (as in the captured auditor agency problem). Although, since I use proved reserves, 
which is the most conservative estimate of reserves available, this potential problem should not 
be too great. The rho in the GLS specification is significantly different from zero, so the contem-
poraneous correlation among residuals does seem to be an issue for the basic model. 
5.2.1 ADDITIONAL POTENTIAL VALUE DRIVERS 
5.2.1.a REAL OPTIONS 
The inclusion of the real call option variable increases the overall explanatory power R2 of the 
regression to over 51% based on the OLS method and over 55% based on the GLS method. In 
this study, the OLS and GLS methods result in the same conclusion - both the intercept and the 
net price coefficients agree with the HVP and the real option coefficients are significant.  These 
results appear to be supportive of the HVP in the fact that both the net price coefficients and the 
intercepts are not significantly different from zero. In particular, the real option variable signifi-
cantly captures the value loss observed in the initial HPV test. The negative sign of the coeffi-
cient suggests that the option to reduce production given a drop in resource prices may be more 
important than the option to expand, (according to put-call parity). The inclusion of the signifi-
cant real option variable may be capturing the stochastic nature of the oil and gas industry where 
production quantity is influenced by net price. The rho for the GLS regression is significant po-
tentially due to correlated error terms but the additional explanatory power, 4% on an R2 basis, is 
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relatively small.  
 5.2.1.b ISOLATING OTHER DATA CHARACTERISTICS 
The regression run using the control variables (oil weighting, proved developed producing re-
serves weighting, and size), does add explanatory value to the original Hotelling (1931) equation 
though not as much as adding the real option variable. However, the coefficient on the net price 
is different from zero which does not support the HVP. Out of the three additional independent 
variables added to the regression only one, size in the OLS specification, is significant. The sign 
on the size coefficient is as expected; size translates into higher value potentially due to liquidity 
and access to capital. All of the other variables do not show a significant impact to value. The 
significant GLS rho of 0.23 has a material impact to the explanatory impact bringing the R2 from 
41% in the OLS regression to over 55% in the GLS specification. The high GLS may mean there 
is still correlated error terms even when these additional variables are added. 
5.2.1.c INCLUDING ALL VARIABLES 
An inclusion of the control variables provides a marginal effect over the basic real option speci-
fication. As in the real option specification, both the intercept and net price coefficient are not 
significantly different from zero and the real options coefficient is significantly negative. How-
ever, the oil weighting variable is also significant in both OLS and GLS specifications. The 
negative signs on the oil weighting variables may mean that the market attributes more value to 
natural gas reserves versus oil reserves. (Or rather the conversion ratio of 6 Mcf per barrel may 
understate natural gas reserve value.) 
 The inclusion of the other variables did increase the explanatory power of the equation to 
55% using the OLS method and 60% using the GLS method.  In each case the rho used in the 
GLS specification is significantly different from zero, so it may be important to consider con-
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temporaneous correlation of the residuals when analysing the panel data, although in this case 
the main conclusions are not affected. 
 Overall, each incremental test version where additional independent variables are added, 
or further unrestricted cases, are statistically significant using an F-test. This means that the par-
simonious restricted models can be rejected in favour of the full model. 
5.2.2 ADDITIONAL ROBUSTNESS TESTS  
5.2.2.a COMMODITY PRICE VOLATILITY 
Breaking the observation period into two categories leaves 39 observations occurring in the 2000 
- 2002 group and 68 observations occurring in the 2003 - 2006 group. The regression results of 
the 2000 - 2002 group can be seen in Table 5.5 while the 2003 - 2006 results can be seen in Ta-
ble 5.6. 
 The results of the 2000 - 2002 time period study do not show support for the HVP. None 
of the regressions have a net price coefficient that is not significantly different from zero and the 
only regressions that have an intercept that is not significantly different from zero is the regres-
sions with the other variables included. The explanatory power of the original Hotelling (1931) 
specification regression is approximately 7% which is significantly lower than the full period R2 
of 29% for the OLS regression and almost 42% for the GLS regression. Additionally, the real 
option variable is significant under the OLS real option specification and the coefficient is posi-
tive, which suggests that the option to expand is still relevant for this period, (as resource prices 
are still relatively low, and production may still have some slack).  However, the real option co-
efficient is not significant when the other variables are added. 
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Table 5.5 - 2000 to 2002 Test Statistics
Main Option Other Variables
Real Oil PDP
Call Weight Weight Size
Intercept Net Price Option Proxy Proxy Proxy
Test Obs Variables X0 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 rho R
2
F SSRes
FULL RESTRICTION 14,726       
Original Hotelling Specification
OLS 39 2 10.5990 -0.9071 0.0000 0.0686 504.5410 521            
0.0000            0.0000            
GLS 39 2 9.6879 -0.8788 0.0555 0.0764 508.9381 517            
0.0000            0.0000            0.5805
With Real Call Option
OLS 39 3 15.4550 -1.2700 5.2903 0.0000 0.1832 374.8361 457            
0.0000 0.0000 0.0268
GLS 39 0 #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! -0.0482 #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE!
#VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE!
With Other
OLS 39 5 6.3445 -0.9728 -1.1945 4.2516 0.4550 0.0000 0.3512 269.1937 363            
0.1810 0.0000 0.0423 0.0287 0.4700
GLS 39 5 7.5028 -0.9610 -1.3214 4.3692 0.1857 0.1083 0.3660 275.6474 355            
0.1253 0.0000 0.0209 0.0163 0.7574 0.3790
With All
OLS 39 6 10.9168 -1.2594 4.2943 -0.9856 4.6242 0.2658 0.0000 0.4195 244.0021 325            
0.0340 0.0000 0.0513 0.0854 0.0139 0.6639
GLS 39 0 #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! -0.0349 #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE!
#VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE!
Table 5.5 presents the results of the OLS and GLS regression variations based on Y = X0 + B 1 X1 + … + B 5 X5 where X0 represent the intercept, X1 represents net price per unit (the main test variable for Hotelling
theory), X2 represents the logarithmic real call option proxy, X3 represents the oil weighting proxy, X4 represents the reserve quality proxy and X5 represents the size proxy.  The regressions are run on the Canadian
oil and gas royalty trust data for the period 2000 - 2002 and the p-values are directly below the coefficients.  None of the specified regressions show support for Hotelling theory.  The GLS results for the Real Call
Option and All specifications above are not included due to positive definiteness of the covariance matrix that arises from the two-stage regression. 
57 
57 
Table 5.6 - 2003 to 2006 Test Statistics
Main Option Other Variables
Real Oil PDP
Call Weight Weight Size
Intercept Net Price Option Proxy Proxy Proxy
Test Obs Variables X0 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 rho R
2
F SSRes
FULL RESTRICTION 9,665         
Original Hotelling Specification
OLS 68 2 0.5564 -0.2969 0.0000 0.3816 110.4241 2,224         
0.8919            0.0082            
GLS 68 2 3.1585 -0.3661 0.0276 0.3850 111.2119 2,212         
0.4771            0.0026            0.5492
With Real Call Option
OLS 68 3 0.6271 -0.3019 0.1583 0.0000 0.3816 72.5021 2,224         
0.8938 0.1226 0.9748
GLS 68 3 3.5413 -0.3921 0.7939 0.0274 0.3852 73.0536 2,211         
0.4912 0.0604 0.8765 0.5394
With Other
OLS 68 5 5.5126 -0.3098 -0.5740 2.0401 -0.6918 0.0000 0.4064 44.4479 2,135         
0.4664 0.0155 0.3858 0.2435 0.5089
GLS 68 5 22.3099 -0.5417 -1.0530 3.1733 -1.8163 0.0826 0.4494 48.9098 1,980         
0.0118 0.0001 0.0959 0.0581 0.0820 0.0301
With All
OLS 68 6 5.5444 -0.2241 -2.8143 -0.7211 1.9666 -0.8356 0.0000 0.4086 36.6314 2,126         
0.4666 0.3029 0.6268 0.3246 0.2654 0.4453
GLS 68 6 22.1645 -0.4571 -2.7602 -1.1959 3.0664 -1.9352 0.0829 0.4516 40.3143 1,972         
0.0130 0.0418 0.6253 0.0876 0.0711 0.0726 0.0312
Table 5.6 presents the results of the OLS and GLS regression variations based on Y = X0 + B 1 X1 + … + B 5 X5 where X0 represent the intercept, X1 represents net price per unit (the main test variable for Hotelling
theory), X2 represents the logarithmic real call option proxy, X3 represents the oil weighting proxy, X4 represents the reserve quality proxy and X5 represents the size proxy.  The regressions are run on the Canadian
oil and gas royalty trust data for the period 2003 - 2006 and the p-values are directly below the coefficients.  Although the original Hotelling specification does not show support for the Hotelling theory, the
OLS regressions with the real call option proxy and with all variables do show support for the theory.
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 The 2003 - 2006 period results still fail to support the HVP, since the net price coeffi-
cients are significantly different from zero. For the basic model and the real option specification, 
rho is not significantly different from zero, which suggests the OLS specification is adequate. 
However, with the inclusion of the control variables, rho becomes significant, so GLS is the 
relevant technique. In this case, the other regressions in the 2003 - 2006 period contain a net 
price coefficient that is significantly different from zero, which provides evidence against the 
HVP. Again, the real option variable is not significant in this period even when conditioning on 
the control variables. This is puzzling given the results from the full and early periods, since I 
would expect a strong negative coefficient would be needed to counter the positive effect ob-
served in the early period and still arrive at a negative coefficient for the full period sample. 
 A major difference between the flat commodity price period versus this period is the ex-
planatory power of the original Hotelling (1931) specification model. The regression of the 2000 
- 2002 period has an R2 of 7% while this period has an R2 of 38%. This supports the theory that 
higher commodity price volatility will result in a more robust model. 
5.2.2.b NATURAL LOGARITHM TEST 
The natural logarithm test further attempts to search out a relationship between reserve value and 
net price. Since value is a positive quantity, the linear specification may not accurately represent 
the true relationship. The natural logarithm tests are carried out in a similar manner to the linear 
test: the full period from 2000 to 2006 can be seen in Table 5.7, the low volatility period from 
2000 to 2002 can be seen in Table 5.8, and the high volatility period from 2003 to 2006 can be 
seen in Table 5.9. Also, each period contains the ancillary tests of including the real option proxy 
and the other control variables.  
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Table 5.7 - Full Period Test Statistics (Natural Logarithm Specification)
Main Option Other Variables
Real Oil PDP
Call Weight Weight Size
Intercept Net Price Option Proxy Proxy Proxy
Test Obs Variables X0 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 rho R
2
F SSRes
FULL RESTRICTION 44.1331
Original Hotelling Specification
OLS 107 2 0.5120 -0.2923 0.0000 0.2568 94.6480 15.7460
0.2157            0.0144            
GLS 107 2 0.5859 -0.3214 0.4697 0.3911 127.0818 12.9021
0.2997            0.0463            0.0000
With Real Call Option
OLS 107 3 -1.2369 0.0095 -0.5615 0.0000 0.4441 95.2206 11.7790
0.0089 0.9336 0.0000
GLS 107 3 -0.1749 -0.1753 -0.2089 0.2205 0.5186 115.3452 10.1988
0.8032 0.3069 0.1222 0.0001
With Other
OLS 107 5 0.0375 -0.5353 -0.0338 -0.0831 0.1960 0.0000 0.4382 55.2295 11.9043
0.9284 0.0000 0.2707 0.3139 0.0000
GLS 107 5 0.7806 -0.5068 -0.0602 0.1091 0.0581 0.2144 0.5664 77.5938 9.1875
0.1601 0.0009 0.0178 0.1189 0.0890 0.0000
With All Variables
OLS 107 6 -1.3352 -0.1867 -0.5586 -0.0947 0.0170 0.1140 0.0000 0.5556 62.0594 9.4167
0.0043 0.1286 0.0000 0.0019 0.8232 0.0023
GLS 107 6 -0.6301 -0.2311 -0.5205 -0.1108 0.1063 0.0333 0.1810 0.6144 74.1055 8.1693
0.3116 0.1376 0.0004 0.0002 0.1145 0.3264 0.0002
Table 5.7 presents the results of the OLS and GLS regression variations based on Y = X0 + B 1 X1 + … + B 5 X5 where X0 represent the intercept, X1 represents net price per unit (the main test variable for Hotelling
theory), X2 represents the logarithmic real call option proxy, X3 represents the oil weighting proxy, X4 represents the reserve quality proxy and X5 represents the size proxy.  The regressions are run on the Canadian
oil and gas royalty trust data for the period 2000 - 2006 and the p-values are directly below the coefficients.  Although the original Hotelling specification does not show support for the Hotelling theory, the
GLS regressions with the real call option proxy and with all variables do show support for the theory. 
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Table 5.8 - 2000 to 2002 Test Statistics  (Natural Logarithm Specification)
Main Option Other Variables
Real Oil PDP
Call Weight Weight Size
Intercept Net Price Option Proxy Proxy Proxy
Test Obs Variables X0 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 rho R
2
F SSRes
FULL RESTRICTION 31.4126
Original Hotelling Specification
OLS 39 2 2.0853 -0.8599 0.0000 0.0377 149.6078 3.4569
0.0000            0.0000            
GLS 39 2 1.9205 -0.8120 0.0608 0.0443 150.7708 3.4332
0.0002            0.0000            0.6160
With Real Call Option
OLS 39 3 4.5053 -1.4274 0.5393 0.0000 0.2331 124.8228 2.7550
0.0000 0.0000 0.0031
GLS 39 3 4.7375 -1.4936 0.5517 -0.0646 0.2727 132.2705 2.6128
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1704
With Other
OLS 39 5 1.7677 -0.9767 -0.0940 0.3561 0.0672 0.0000 0.3934 91.2191 2.1792
0.0005 0.0000 0.0350 0.0184 0.1702
GLS 39 5 1.8531 -0.9625 -0.1066 0.3663 0.0436 0.1257 0.4101 94.0010 2.1191
0.0029 0.0000 0.0121 0.0088 0.3456 0.3331
With All
OLS 39 6 3.5516 -1.3693 0.3988 -0.0563 0.4057 0.0468 0.0000 0.4743 85.9937 1.8883
0.0002 0.0000 0.0263 0.2114 0.0052 0.3205
GLS 39 6 3.9220 -1.4619 0.4803 -0.0457 0.4134 0.0489 -0.0444 0.4882 88.4669 1.8386
0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.2730 0.0047 0.3015 0.3520
Table 5.8 presents the results of the OLS and GLS regression variations based on Y = X0 + B 1 X1 + … + B 5 X5 where X0 represent the intercept, X1 represents net price per unit (the main test variable for Hotelling
theory), X2 represents the logarithmic real call option proxy, X3 represents the oil weighting proxy, X4 represents the reserve quality proxy and X5 represents the size proxy.  The regressions are run on the Canadian
oil and gas royalty trust data for the period 2000 - 2002 and the p-values are directly below the coefficients. None of the specified regressions show support for Hotelling theory.
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Table 5.9 - 2003 to 2006 Test Statistics (Natural Logarithm Specification)
Main Option Other Variables
Real Oil PDP
Call Weight Weight Size
Intercept Net Price Option Proxy Proxy Proxy
Test Obs Variables X0 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 rho R
2
F SSRes
FULL RESTRICTION 12.7205
Original Hotelling Specification
OLS 68 2 -0.4555 0.0272 0.0000 0.3678 71.9159 4.0011
0.4453            0.8699            
GLS 68 2 -0.1944 -0.0450 0.0199 0.3695 72.2082 3.9900
0.7581            0.7979            0.6695
With Real Call Option
OLS 68 3 -0.4618 0.0282 -0.0020 0.0000 0.3678 47.2176 4.0011
0.6017 0.8858 0.9924
GLS 68 3 -0.1482 -0.0520 0.0152 0.0195 0.3696 47.4158 3.9896
0.8746 0.8041 0.9419 0.6669
With Other
OLS 68 5 -0.1779 -0.0468 -0.0297 0.1204 -0.0071 0.0000 0.4062 30.0531 3.7577
0.7827 0.8052 0.2885 0.1015 0.8725
GLS 68 5 1.2710 -0.3605 -0.0486 0.1697 -0.0512 0.0764 0.4433 32.8970 3.5228
0.0991 0.0814 0.0720 0.0174 0.2433 0.0447
With All
OLS 68 6 -0.5101 0.0130 -0.1353 -0.0385 0.1167 -0.0157 0.0000 0.4091 24.8139 3.7398
0.5675 0.9529 0.5874 0.2364 0.1161 0.7385
GLS 68 6 0.8821 -0.2936 -0.1722 -0.0603 0.1641 -0.0623 0.0795 0.4483 27.3125 3.4916
0.3779 0.2130 0.4942 0.0572 0.0231 0.1791 0.0399
Table 5.9 presents the results of the OLS and GLS regression variations based on Y = X0 + B 1 X1 + … + B 5 X5 where X0 represent the intercept, X1 represents net price per unit (the main test variable for Hotelling
theory), X2 represents the logarithmic real call option proxy, X3 represents the oil weighting proxy, X4 represents the reserve quality proxy and X5 represents the size proxy.  The regressions are run on the Canadian
oil and gas royalty trust data for the period 2003 - 2006 and the p-values are directly below the coefficients.  All of the regressions show support for the Hotelling theory.
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 The full period results found in Table 5.7 using the natural logarithm specification pro-
duce a similar conclusion to the linear specification: there is no support for the original Hotelling 
specification. Furthermore, both the intercept and the net price coefficient are not statistically 
different from zero, and the real option coefficient is significantly negative. Also, the explanatory 
powers of the regression are similar to those of the linear specified model. 
 The results of the flat commodity price volatility period from 2000 to 2002 can be seen in 
Table 5.8. The results are similar to the linear specification, but generally stronger: all variables 
are significant and the GLS method is well specified in this case. Furthermore, the signs of the 
net price and real option coefficients are the same as in the linear case. 
 The natural logarithm results from the volatile period 2003 to 2006 can be found in Table 
5.9.  This time period, using the natural logarithm transformation, provides the most support for 
the HVP among all of the other analysis. Every regression shows the intercept and net price coef-
ficients not significantly different from zero, even the original Hotelling specification.  Addition-
ally, all of the other variables, with the exception of reserve quality in the GLS regressions, are 
not significant which further provides support for the HVP.  These results show that, in a volatile 
commodity price environment, the HVP may hold under the natural logarithm specification. 
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CHAPTER 6   CONCLUSION 
  
The HVP states that the value of oil and gas reserves is equal to the current net price of those 
reserves times the quantity, or equivalently that net prices rise at the discount rate. Previous stud-
ies have found support both for, and against, the HVP, although the majority of these studies 
have used data that is deficient to provide an accurate test of the principle. 
 
6.1 CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
This study attempts to remedy the deficiencies in previous studies and provide the most defini-
tive test of the HVP to date. By utilizing Canadian oil and gas royalty trusts as the sample I am 
able to mitigate the average cost information used in acquisition based studies and it also allows 
me to remove the “management exploration expertise” premium found in previous studies using 
conventional oil and gas exploration and production companies. For this test, I use 22 Canadian 
oil and gas royalty trusts spanning a period from 2000 to 2006 for a total of 107 observations. 
 My study generally fails to find support for the HVP. In particular, the results indicate 
that the HVP overestimates reserve value. This suggests that market participants expect net 
prices to grow at a rate significantly lower then the fair cost of capital, and production constraints 
limiting the extraction rate are binding. I do find that the real option proxy explains a significant 
amount of the difference between the value observed and the value predicted by the HVP. This 
differs markedly from what previous literature on the HVP applied to market data for the oil and 
gas industry documents. Each of these papers fails to reject the HVP. The fact that I generally 
find the value to be lower than that predicted by the HVP is not surprising given the previous 
literature using market data to test it. Since these studies use conventional oil and gas companies, 
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which likely overvalue reserves because of an exploration premium, finding support for the HVP 
likely means that royalty trusts will likely correspond to a value lower than that predicted. The 
difference would account for the exploration premium. On the other hand, when I use the log-
linear specification over the second, more volatile sub-sample, I also fail to reject Hotelling’s 
theoretical value, which is consistent with previous literature.  
 
6.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Although my study attempts to provide the most definitive test to date on the HVP’s application 
to the oil and gas industry – there are still the factors apparent in this specific industry such as 
government regulation and monopolistic forces that make the application difficult. Additionally, 
there are other potential explanations of why the HVP does not hold in my test, although the 
verification of these hypotheses goes beyond the scope of this paper: 
1. The market believes the independent engineer estimates are overestimated:  There may be a 
perceived conflict of interest for the independent engineers who produce the reserve esti-
mates. For instance, in an attempt to do repeat business with a specific trust an independent 
reserve engineer may try to provide the highest estimate of reserves. This overestimate may 
not be fully reflected in value as the market artificially haircuts the reserves to compensate 
for any potential conflicts of interest. 
2. The study is geographically isolated. Oil and natural gas (although less so) is a worldwide 
commodity that is influenced by forces throughout the globe. By examining just one segment 
of this worldwide industry I am biased by potential factors that only affect the specific mar-
ket I am looking at. For instance, government environmental regulations in Alberta or the 
United States may be different than those in Saudi Arabia resulting in different cost struc-
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tures and leading to bias in the net price inputs.  
3. The quantification of reserves in the model cannot be specified. If the Hotelling (1931) as-
sumption holds, eventually every barrel of oil and every gas molecule will become economi-
cal to recover due to the positive net price growth rate. However, the estimates used in previ-
ous literature of HVP tests are based on reserves that are economically recoverable at today’s 
prices. There is a big discrepancy between what is estimated as reserves now and what will 
be estimated as reserves if net price keeps growing indefinitely. 
4. The assumption that cost remains constant regardless of quantity produced. Typically, a pro-
ducer would go after reserves that are less costly to produce first. 
 
6.3 FUTURE RESEARCH 
It is hoped that this study has accomplished its intention of providing the most definitive conclu-
sion of the HVP to date. However, I do not believe this essentially “closes the book” on the topic 
but rather opens it up to new avenues. For instance, future studies on this topic could potentially 
examine: 
1. Future growth rate assessments: As the world heads toward “peak” oil (and gas) supply 
should be reduced forcing upward price pressure. Maybe then net price will grow at the dis-
count rate. 
2. World study:  Study observations from around the world since oil and gas is a worldwide 
commodity and North America only makes up a small segment of the sector. 
3. U.S. Master Limited Partnerships (in time):  U.S. oil and gas MLPs are now starting to get 
rolling again and should get more popular as Canadian oil and gas royalty trusts disappear. 
 As we come closer to a world decline in the production of hydrocarbons the issue of con-
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servation and allocation becomes more pronounced. The study of the Hotelling (1931) theory 
provides a starting point for the allocation between economic maximization for resources owners 
and Pareto optimal distribution among generations. However, the factors present in the oil and 
gas industry are too complex to be captured by the straightforward HVP. Other factors, such as 
real options, are needed to capture the stochastic elements existing in the oil and gas industry.  
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APPENDIX A1   SCATTERPLOT OF OBSERVATIONS 
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Figure A1.1 Scatterplot of Value versus Net Price 
This figure shows the scattering of net price per barrel of oil equivalent on the independent (x axis) versus the mar-
ket value per barrel of oil equivalent reserve on the dependent (y axis). Market value is represented through enter-
prise value which also includes the debt component, if any. 
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APPENDIX A2   OIL AND GAS DEFINITIONS 
 
Barrels of Oil Equivalent: A standard unit of measure whereby gas is converted to an equiva-
lent barrel of oil based on either their heat content or economic value. 
 
Common Pool: A natural occurring underground accumulation of oil and/or natural gas (and 
separate from other accumulations) where two or more entities have an interest. 
 
Decline Rate: The rate at which a well’s production declines due to natural and, occasionally, 
man-introduced forces. Expressed in percent per year. 
 
Economically Recoverable: An estimate of resources, including oil and/or natural gas, both 
proved and undiscovered, that would be economically extractable under specified price-cost rela-
tionships and technological conditions. 
 
In-situ: Confined to the site of origin. “In the earth” when referring to oil and natural gas re-
serves. 
 
Net Price: The selling price (revenue) received for a reserve unit less the costs of extracting and 
selling the unit. Also known as Netback. 
 
Reserve Life: Remaining reserves divided by annual production. 
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Unitization: A term denoting a common operation of separately owned producing leases in an 
oil and natural gas pool or reservoir. A legal process which defines operatorship, ownership, 
working interest, royalties, etc. and provides for more economical operation and subsequent re-
covery. 
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APPENDIX A3   REQUIRED DATA ADJUSTMENTS 
 
Acclaim Energy Trust: 
1. Closed $174 million acquisition of Elk Point Resources Inc. on January 28, 2003. 
2. Closed $9 million asset divestiture in Q1 2004.  
Advantage Energy Income Fund: 
1. Closed $62 million acquisition of a private oil and gas company on January 8, 2002. 
ARC Energy Trust: 
1. Closed $485 million acquisition of Startech Energy Inc. on February 1, 2001. 
Crescent Point Energy Trust: 
1. Closed $81 million acquisition of Capio Petroleum Corporation on January 6, 2004. 
2. Closed $257 million asset acquisition on January 9, 2006. 
3. Closed $627 million acquisition of Mission Oil & Gas Inc. on February 9, 2007. 
Enerplus Resources Fund: 
1. Closed $123 million acquisition of Ice Energy Limited on January 7, 2004. 
NAL Oil & Gas Trust: 
1. Closed $18 million asset divestiture on January 1, 2001.  
2. Closed $550 million asset acquisition on February 10, 2005. 
Pengrowth Energy Trust 
1. Closed $1,038 million asset acquisition on January 22, 2007. 
Petrofund Energy Trust: 
1. Closed $24 million asset acquisition on January 1, 2001. 
2. Closed $40 million asset acquisition on March 5, 2002. 
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PrimeWest Energy Trust: 
1. Closed $700 million acquisition of Cypress Energy Inc. on March 29, 2001. 
2. Closed $206 million asset acquisition on January 23, 2003. 
3. Closed $35 million acquisition of Seventh Energy Ltd. on March 16, 2004. 
Shiningbank Energy Income Fund: 
1. Closed $175 million acquisition of Birchill Resources Limited on March 8, 2004. 
Vermilion Energy Trust: 
1. Closed $95 million asset acquisition on March 10, 2005. 
2. Closed $140 million asset acquisition on May 8, 2007. 
Viking Energy Royalty Trust: 
1. Closed $320 million acquisition of KeyWest Energy Corporation on February 26, 2003. 
2. Closed $450 million merger with Calpine Natural Gas Trust on February 1, 2005. 
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